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1Preface
This evaluation was completed during the Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP) Transformation 
exercise of 2011/12, which was a time of considerable change within the Corporate Centre of the 
DWP. 
The DWP Transformation (or ‘Corporate Centre Review’) was announced in February 2011, the 
purpose of which was to streamline accountability for key Departmental functions so as to best 
achieve the Coalition Government’s programme of welfare reform, to introduce more flexible 
ways of working, and to facilitate a reduction in staffing in line with the austerity measures of this 
administration. As such, around 10,000 people were assessed and posted, or left the Department 
during the 2011/12 financial year.
Also, from October 2011, the senior executive team supporting the Permanent Secretary was 
reorganised under the following Director General accounts:
• Chief Operating Officer;
• Strategy;
• Professional Services;
• Finance;
• Corporate IT;
• Human Resources.
Of particular relevance to this evaluation is the bringing together of the various operational functions 
of Jobcentre Plus, the Pensions, Disability and Carers Service and externally-contracted employment 
services under a single Operations banner. More specifically, it is important to note the consequent 
re-branding of the Jobcentre Plus Directorates included in this evaluation:
• Jobcentre Directorate as Work Services Directorate;
• Contact Centre Directorate as part of Network Services Directorate (alongside Digital/ 
Online Services);
• Benefit Centre Directorate as part of Benefits Directorate (alongside disability benefits).
There have also been changes to Operational Performance Planning and Change with the 
movement of national performance reporting functions into Finance (as part of Operational Planning 
and Performance Management) and national performance improvement functions into Operational 
Excellence Directorate (which is part of Operations). However, the original terminology is used 
throughout this report, as the changes were still taking affect during the evaluation fieldwork, and 
while the nominal changes have corporate significance within DWP, the original terminology will still 
resonate with most readers of this report.
As part of the DWP Transformation, there were also numerous lower-level staffing changes and 
shifts in the line of accountability. Much of this was underway during the fieldwork period, and 
provides the broader context for the evaluation.
Preface
2Summary 
Background
In April 2011 a new Performance Management Framework (PMF) was launched in Jobcentre Plus 
to replace the previous targets structure. The aim of this evaluation is to explore the extent to 
which the PMF meets its objectives as a more streamlined approach to managing and monitoring 
performance in Jobcentre Plus. The evaluation explores staff understanding and awareness of 
the PMF, the implementation and communication process and early evidence of the influence the 
PMF had upon cultural and behavioural change across Jobcentre Plus. The evaluation is based on 
qualitative data collected through 111 semi-structured interviews with staff working in Jobcentre 
Plus and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and relevant secondary data in PMF project 
management documents. The fieldwork took place in October–November 2011. 
The Performance Management Framework
The PMF emphasises two key objectives for Jobcentre Plus and DWP:
• moving people off benefit, into employment, as quickly as possible; and
• reducing the monetary value of fraud and error (MVFE). 
The PMF is underpinned by a range of additional ‘supporting measures’. A set of five scorecards were 
introduced alongside the PMF: 
• one for each operational Directorate (Jobcentre, Contact Centre and Benefit Centre); 
• one for MVFE; and 
• a Group Delivery Network (GDN) scorecard designed to understand the way in which customers 
undertake a ‘journey’ through Jobcentre Plus services.
Communication
The communication process underpinning the implementation of the PMF appears to have been 
effective in raising awareness to varying degrees within the organisation. Several concerns were 
raised by some PMF Project Team members and National managers about this; these included a 
lack of adequate resources, capacity building and engagement of frontline staff. Several methods 
of communication (e.g. presentations, emails, team meetings) as well as different interpretations 
of the PMF supporting materials were used by different staff. This resulted in varying overall and 
specific awareness of the PMF, particularly among operational staff.
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3Awareness and understanding
Overall the research suggests that:
• There is a strong connection between the stated objectives of the new PMF and the 
understanding of a wide range of respondents involved in the research. Where staff at all levels of 
the organisation and in all Directorates know about the PMF, there appears to be a widely shared 
and common understanding of its purpose as being to drive a cultural change toward outcome-
focused activities, enhanced efficiency and to support flexibility among frontline Advisers in 
Jobcentres. 
• Generally respondents thought that the new PMF was in line with the objectives set for it. 
• In particular, respondents were satisfied that the two outcome measures were an appropriate 
representation of the purpose and objectives of Jobcentre Plus.
• There was some concern however among the PMF Project Team that the scorecards were diluting 
the initial design of the system. 
• While many respondents at all levels of the organisation recognised the need for culture change, 
this had only partly occurred at the time of the fieldwork. 
• There were clearly cases where operational staff did not feel that there had been any reduction 
in the emphasis on numerical targets, especially in Contact Centres and Benefit Centres, though 
sometimes this related to initiatives other than the PMF, such as workflow management 
processes.
Managing performance 
Key findings include:
• The PMF is being used to structure performance management at all levels of the organisation, 
though scorecards are widely seen as the ‘face’ of the PMF at operational levels. Frontline staff 
tend to understand the management of their performance according to the specific interpretation 
of the PMF/scorecards taken by their line manager. In many cases this is not presented or 
rationalised as being part of the ‘PMF’ and is also frequently driven by the consideration of 
alternative (though mostly consistent) information. This suggests that managerial interpretation 
of the PMF is crucial to its implementation and the achievement of the culture change desired. 
• Some respondents, especially at District level in Jobcentre Directorate lacked an awareness of 
the full range of available outcome information and clearly indicated that having this information 
would assist them in managing performance, especially around the off-flow rate. 
• In Jobcentres there is significant local-level data collection and duplication in this activity. While 
this is inefficient, it may also be driving local operational ownership of the process of culture 
change which the PMF is aiming for.
• In Jobcentres, the introduction of the PMF has affected Adviser roles significantly. This is 
particularly driven by the removal of Intervention Delivery Target (IDT), the introduction of 
increased flexibility and the use of caseload management, prioritisation and cohort lists to 
manage the performance of individual Advisers. 
• There are differences in practice between Districts. Some Districts offered more flexibility to 
Advisers than others. In those Districts where there was less flexibility, informal activity-based 
targets were in use.
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performance are now undertaken widely, there is reason to be cautious about the extent to which 
these practices are embedded and will be sustained over the medium to longer term.
• In Contact Centres the major shift that has occurred alongside the introduction of the PMF is that 
from the measurement of Average call Handling Time (AHT) to a range of additional quantitative 
measures and more qualitative processes for managing performance. It was not always clear, 
though, that these changes were the direct result of the introduction of the PMF. 
• In Benefit Centres the new scorecards may have driven a declining emphasis on the Average 
Actual Clearance Time (AACT) measure and in particular reducing perverse incentives that 
previously operated in the way that AACT was operated. However, the major concern among 
respondents appeared to be related to the introduction of a new workflow management system 
rather than the PMF.
Motivation and behaviour
The research findings suggest that the PMF (in combination with other initiatives) is associated with 
neutral or positive developments in terms of motivation and behaviour in each of the Directorates. 
However, there is considerable variation within and between sites and geographical locations, and 
care should be exercised when seeking to generalise the research findings:
• In Jobcentres the increase in flexibility appeared to be empowering and motivating for Advisers, 
though there were some small concerns about the lack of connection between the outcome 
measures and the role, for example, of Assistant Advisers. 
• In Contact Centres staff were pleased by the slight rebalancing of the managerial emphasis away 
from the AHT.
• In Benefit Centres staff were being driven in the main by workflow management systems rather 
than PMF and some found this de-motivating either because they felt that good performance was 
rewarded by additional workflow or because it incentivised staff to be less efficient.
• There is some contested evidence that perverse incentives may operate under the PMF for 
Advisers in Jobcentres in relation to customer prioritisation in particular. However, it was not 
possible to reach definitive conclusions on this and much depends on the definition of what is and 
is not appropriate. 
• On the other hand, there was clear and considerable evidence that the PMF and the removal of 
the IDT has led to a significant reduction in perverse incentives to misdirect Adviser and other 
resource to generate unnecessary interventions.
• In Contact Centres, though it was not widely discussed by respondents in an explicit sense, 
there was some reason to conclude that there may have been a reduction in some important 
perverse incentives. For example, the motivation to reduce call time through inappropriate call 
terminations appeared to be both reduced and countered by the range of alternative performance 
management practices and indicators used.
• In Benefit Centres, the shift toward time bands rather than a single milestone in the operation  
of the AACT appeared to have removed any incentive that might have previously operated to  
de-prioritise long-running outstanding claims. 
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5Governance and transparency 
The PMF Project Team reported strong governance structures in the design process, albeit with the 
noted weakness of insufficient senior operational management input from Jobcentre Plus. However, 
the ongoing governance arrangements for the PMF were less clear for respondents at the time of 
the fieldwork because of the reorganisation of the Department that was underway at that point 
in time. In particular, the lack of publically available outcome information is felt to hinder external 
transparency and accountability. There is reason to think that the centralisation of performance 
reporting and monitoring in DWP will lead to more effective and efficient support for performance 
improvement in the future, but at the time of conducting the fieldwork no hard evidence of these 
improvements was available.
Cross-cutting themes 
Value for money and productivity, and customer experience are the two cross-cutting themes which 
lie at the heart of the PMF. Results here were mixed with respondents expressing a range of views 
associated with the impact of the PMF, ranging from those who reported no adverse impact to those 
who reported that PMF had positively supported the improvement of both. On the positive side there 
was some evidence that there was an increased awareness of the links between Directorates at the 
GDN level as a result of the ‘customer journey’ scorecard. The impact of the PMF on disadvantaged 
groups was unclear and complex. 
Conclusions 
The main conclusions from the evaluation can be summarised under the key research questions:
• Is the performance of Jobcentre Plus being measured in the right way? The two outcome 
measures are widely regarded as being an appropriate measure of Jobcentre Plus performance. 
However, there was some disagreement about the role of the scorecards. The PMF has had more 
impact in Jobcentre Directorate than Contact or Benefit Centres but there has been some positive 
impact in these also.
• What do staff understand about the PMF? Awareness and understanding of the PMF is good 
down to District management level in Jobcentre Directorate and to site management level in the 
Contact Centre and Benefit Centre Directorates. Below this, awareness and understanding of the 
PMF in its entirety is limited.
• Does the PMF provide adequate support within the increasingly flexible environment? Though 
there was some divergence of practice, it appeared that in the main the PMF is in line with the 
increasing flexibilities being introduced through the Jobcentre Plus Offer.
• Are staff and their managers more focused and accountable for the right outcomes for 
customers? There is considerable evidence in Jobcentre Directorate that the PMF focus on off-
flows is translating into a greater operational emphasis on helping customers make the transition 
from benefits to work. There is also evidence of positive impacts in Benefit Centres arising out of 
the introduction of time bands for the measurement of benefit clearance times, which reduces 
any perverse incentives that might have existed in the previous system to ‘park’ long-running 
outstanding claims. There is less evidence of impact in Contact Centres, primarily because 
alternative real-time performance data is available through the telephony system. However, the 
balancing of quantitative measures of call handling times with qualitative checks of calls and data 
entry is marginally altering the balance of performance management in favour of quality over 
productivity.
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impact the introduction of the PMF has had on harder-to-help customer groups, though many 
respondents thought that it was neutral.
• How are governance routes working under the PMF? The governance of the PMF is complex and 
the considerable change underway in the organisation immediately prior and also during the 
fieldwork phase make this difficult to judge conclusively. In theory however, the centralisation of 
performance reporting and monitoring ought to result in efficiency savings and faster sharing of 
good practice.
• Is there a clear line of sight between activities, productivity and outcomes? Overall this is positive 
but there is considerable scope for further improvement.
Implications
The main implications of the evaluation findings for the development of the PMF are that: 
• there is a need to continue to promote culture change envisaged as part of the PMF; 
• there is a need to continue to promote the sharing of good practice between sites, Districts, 
Groups and Directorates; 
• awareness needs to be raised of the availability of nationally-produced performance information; 
• managers and Advisers in Jobcentre Directorate need to be clear about expectations in relation to 
customer prioritisation and the way that the PMF supports this; and 
• there is scope for further integration of performance management across DWP and within the 
Departmental Business Planning process. 
Summary
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1.1 Background
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is accountable for performance against six broad 
Departmental priorities as set out in the Departmental Structural Reform Plan (DWP 2011a):
• Reform the welfare system – introduce Universal Credit and other reforms to simplify the welfare 
system and to ensure that the system always incentivises work, and that work always pays.
• Get Britain working – introduce the Work Programme, an integrated package of personalised 
support to get people into work – from jobseekers who have been out of work for some time, to 
those who may have been receiving incapacity benefits for many years.
• Help tackle the causes of poverty – develop a welfare system that recognises work as the primary 
route out of poverty and reduces the number of children in workless households. Introduce a new 
child poverty strategy focused on eradicating child poverty by 2020.
• Pensions reform – provide decent State Pensions, encourage employers to provide high-quality 
pensions and make automatic enrolment and higher pension saving a reality. Phase out the 
retirement age to allow more flexibility around retirement.
• Achieve disability equality – improve equality by promoting work for disabled people, developing 
new ways to deliver Access to Work and introducing Work Choice to provide employment support 
for disabled people facing the greatest barriers. Support more independent living for those who 
face the greatest barriers and cannot work.
• Improve our service to the public – continue to deliver an excellent service to the public, improving 
its speed, ease and efficiency. 
At the same time as delivering the priorities set out above, the Department also needs to consider 
its requirements under the Public Services Transparency Framework (Her Majesty's Treasury 2010). 
This stipulates that the Department must be committed to improving the quality of services and 
delivering value for money.
To further this agenda, a new Performance Management Framework (PMF) for Jobcentre Plus was 
introduced at the beginning of April 2011. It aims to introduce a more streamlined approach to 
managing and monitoring performance. The central focus of the PMF is on two key objectives for 
Jobcentre Plus and DWP:
• moving people off benefit into work as quickly as possible; and 
• reducing the monetary value of fraud and error.
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The PMF was introduced as the replacement for the previous target structure which was based on 
six targets (Box 1) and considered within both DWP and Jobcentre Plus to be expensive, inefficient, 
complex and difficult to understand and which, in some cases, could drive inappropriate behaviour. 
This view shaped the context for the introduction of the PMF in the first instance. The successful 
introduction and development of the PMF requires a significant cultural change within both the 
Department and Jobcentre Plus. The Jobcentre Plus Offer, introduced alongside the PMF, frees-up 
Jobcentre Advisers to focus on outcomes rather than completing processes, providing Advisers with 
the flexibility to target resources according to claimant and local labour market need. The Jobcentre 
Plus Offer is the subject of a separate evaluation.
The PMF was intended to foster a culture of continuous improvement at all levels, with the new 
framework itself being subject to review so that it remains fit for purpose in the light of new policy 
developments and organisational changes within the Department as a whole. The PMF has been 
developed and implemented in a period where there have been major changes in DWP which 
involve a reduction in corporate centre staffing and reorganisation of performance reporting and 
performance improvement within the Department. 
Outcome measures 
Value for money and productivity
Departmental objectives, including: 
Delivery of structural reform, including Get Britain Working 
Delivery of in-year plans to improve the Department’s impact 
Delivery of improved efficiency 
Delivery of improved service to the public 
Jobcentre Plus objectives  
Moving people off benefit, into 
employment, as quickly as possible 
Administering benefits efficiently and 
effectively to reduce fraud and error losses 
Benefit off-flow rates into employment The monetary value of fraud and error
Supporting data
E.g. average benefit duration; 
benefit cycling 
E.g. data matching hit rates; 
MVFE cause types 
Customer experience
Cross-cutting themes
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• The Job Outcome Target – which allocated different points values to customers depending on 
which ‘customer group’ they fell into. When a customer belonging to a particular group moved 
from benefits into work the specified number of points were added to the overall score for 
Jobcentre Plus and this could be disaggregated to District level.
• The Intervention Delivery Target – which measured the number of types of interventions (mainly 
Work Focused Interviews) completed at the specified point in the customer claim according to 
the different benefit rules. The score was presented as a percentage of interventions completed 
at the specified time.
• The Customer Service Target – which was based on scores in a series of ‘mystery shopper’ 
exercises throughout the organisation.
• The Average Actual Clearance Time Target – which measured time taken to complete the 
processing of various types of benefit claims. 
• The Employer Engagement Target – which measured employer satisfaction with vacancy 
placement and filling services.
• The Monetary Value of Fraud and Error – which is a sample-based estimation of the total value 
of fraud and error on all benefit claims.
1.2 Overview of the evaluation study 
The aim of the evaluation is to explore whether the PMF meets its objectives in providing an 
improved system for performance measurement and management for Jobcentre Plus (and DWP). 
The process evaluation explores implementation and utilisation of the new PMF in and by each 
operational Directorate (Jobcentres, Contact Centres and Benefit Centres). The headline research 
questions for the evaluation are summarised below with the full list of research questions outlined in 
Appendix A.
• Is the performance of Jobcentre Plus being measured in the right way? 
• What do staff understand about the PMF? 
• Does the PMF provide adequate support within the increasingly flexible environment? 
• Are staff and their managers more focused and accountable for the right outcomes for 
customers? 
• Is there enough incentive to work with harder-to-help customer groups? 
• How are governance routes working under the PMF? 
• Is there a clear line of sight between activities, productivity and outcomes? 
The evaluation draws on qualitative primary data collected through semi-structured telephone and 
face-to-face interviews with employees drawn from across the organisation and relevant secondary 
data in PMF project management documents. A total of 111 respondents contributed to the 
research. Table 1.1 provides an indication of those participating in the evaluation study.
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The approach to sampling and fieldwork included:
• preliminary scoping interviews with DWP and Jobcentre Plus strategy staff involved in developing 
the PMF;
• interviews with national and local level OPPC (Operational Performance Planning and Change) 
representatives and performance reporting and performance improvement staff;
• fieldwork in three Group Delivery Networks including one District and two Jobcentres, one Contact 
Centre and one Benefit Centre.
Table 1.1 Summary of fieldwork respondents
Unit of analysis Role Number
PMF Project Team Senior managers and analysts from DWP and Jobcentre Plus 
Corporate Centre 
11
National managers Jobcentre Plus Directors and national team leaders from OPPC 10
Group-level managers Work Services Directors and Group managers from Jobcentre 
Directorate, Benefit Centre Directorate, Contact Centre 
Directorate and OPPC
12
District-level managers District managers, Business managers and Performance 
Improvement leads from Jobcentre Directorate and OPPC 
9
Operational managers Centre managers, Adviser Team Managers, Performance Team 
Leaders and Team Leaders in Benefit Centres and Contact 
Centres
35
Frontline operational staff Jobcentre Directorate: Personal Advisers, Assistant Advisers 34
Contact Centre Directorate: Customer Service Agents 
Benefit Centre Directorate: Customer Service Officers
Total 111
Semi-structured discussion guides were designed and used to collect the qualitative data from the 
research participants (Appendix B). The interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, coded and 
then analysed using NVIVO software. The data are analysed in terms of the views of respondents 
located in different areas of the organisation (Contact Centres, Benefit Centres, Jobcentres, 
Operational Performance, Planning and Change, DWP) and at different levels (PMF Project Team, 
National managers, Group-level managers, District-level managers, Operational managers and 
operational frontline staff). 
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2 Communication
2.1 The communication process
The communication process for the new Performance Management Framework (PMF) was launched 
at two national workshops held in Manchester and London in March 2011. These were attended by 
Regional Group Performance and District-level managers. Senior managers from Strategic Planning 
and Assurance Division and Operational Performance Planning and Change (OPPC) provided an 
introduction and overview of how to use and work with all the elements of the PMF. 
Communication of the PMF was supported by a series of resources including:
• a letter to all staff from the Chief Operating Officer introducing the PMF and the new outcome 
measures; 
• a video presented by the Chief Operating Officer housed on the organisation’s intranet;
• a PowerPoint presentation introducing the PMF;
• a PMF handbook providing detailed information on the outcome measures and supporting data;
• documents outlining PMF scorecard definitions for Fraud and Error, Group Delivery Network, 
Benefit Centre Directorate, Contact Centre Directorate and Jobcentre Directorate.
Participants reported on the variety of ways in which this information was then cascaded through 
the organisation. Experiences of this process differed predominantly according to the respondents’ 
position and role in the organisation and, in the case of the national respondents, their role in the 
design and development of the PMF.
PMF Project Team respondents were engaged with the strategic design and implementation of the 
framework, detailed information about which was cascaded to National managers in Jobcentre 
Plus (Directors and national team leaders from OPPC) and this process was repeated throughout the 
hierarchical structure:
• Group level managers, for example, undertook sessions with their senior management teams. 
One respondent identified manager capability training as an opportunity to reinforce messages 
about the PMF and to embed understanding. 
• District-level managers had attended one of the initial workshops and others were briefed about 
the PMF by OPPC. A variety of communication methods were used in addition to the workshops 
including emails, team meetings and an information pack that included the original PowerPoint 
presentation. One District manager reported being ‘drip-fed’ information about the PMF through 
emails and team meetings. Information was then shared with senior staff within the district. One 
example of this included a District manager doing a ‘walk through’ (meeting to consider each 
section of the handbook in detail) of the PMF handbook with different staff teams.
• Operational managers became aware of the PMF via team meetings, emails, intranet alerts and 
one-to-one meetings (or a combination of methods). Some operational managers had attended 
presentations while others had been provided with electronic information or had discussed the 
framework with their management teams. They then cascaded this information to their staff 
using similar methods, with the framework usually discussed at various team meetings. In some 
cases, both District and operational managers reported that they tailored the information to make 
it more appropriate to their staff. 
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• Operational staff mostly indicated that they had heard about the framework through a mix of 
team meetings and emails. Respondents at this level frequently struggled to remember the 
introduction of the PMF specifically, instead suggesting that information was probably provided in 
this manner because this was the ‘normal’ procedure. Several managers reported that they had 
kept the information provided to Operational Staff to a minimum because of the volume of other 
changes underway at the same time.
2.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
Overall, communication of the PMF was reported to be reasonably effective at the National level, 
but less so as information was cascaded down to District levels and the process became more 
fragmented. While some PMF Project Team and National managers expressed concern about 
this, most operational managers and staff were reasonably content with their engagement in the 
process and their level of awareness of the PMF. 
Communication process issues included:
• Building capacity – There were concerns among managers at all levels of the organisation that 
communication about the PMF was under-resourced, came relatively late, with the process 
happening too fast, and leaving little time for staff training. This began with what was perceived, 
among some PMF Project Team and National manager respondents, to be the relatively late 
organisation of the national workshops and, subsequently, the late exposure of operational 
staff to the framework. One PMF Project Team respondent reported that the communications 
embargo implemented in February and March prevented staged information provision, instead 
necessitating a ‘big bang’ when the PMF was introduced in April. 
• Consistency of message – The messages about the PMF that were rolled out across the 
organisation were not always consistent. For example, it was described by some as being a radical 
change and by others as simply a change in emphasis. In some cases, decisions were taken at 
managerial level to limit the amount of information cascaded to operational staff since it was 
perceived that it was not necessary for them to know or understand the detail of the Framework. 
• Engagement of frontline staff – The research revealed that the communication process had 
largely failed to raise awareness of the PMF among operational staff. A significant number of 
operational managers and staff had difficulty remembering how information about the PMF was 
communicated and some, particularly within Contact Centres and Benefit Centres, demonstrated 
little awareness of it. Some of the PMF Project Team were concerned about the lack of personal 
engagement with operational staff in the communication process, particularly on a face-to-face 
basis. This was partly attributed to budgetary constraints. It was suggested that operational site-
level staff should have been involved in the initial workshops rather than having to rely on the 
cascading process. 
• Volume of information – The sheer volume of information being disseminated associated with 
both the PMF, and the number of other changes being implemented within the organisation, were 
also identified as a barrier to developing awareness of the PMF by operational staff. In Jobcentre 
Directorate in particular, it was suggested that staff did not necessarily distinguish between 
the PMF and the Jobcentre Plus Offer because the two were introduced at the same time. The 
challenge of balancing the pressures of delivering frontline services with the need to take time 
to share and absorb information about the changes was reported by operational staff and 
acknowledged by operational managers and above. 
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• PMF supporting information – Overall, there was recognition among fieldwork participants 
that there was sufficient supporting information available about the PMF if staff had the time 
and inclination to read it. A good example of this is the ‘PMF handbook’ which on the one hand 
provides the very detailed information that many operational respondents (frontline staff and 
some managers) appeared to lack, but was also described as being too detailed and onerous 
to provide an accessible reference for all staff. Some managers tailored the content to make it 
more relevant for the staff they were sharing it with, but this was not done on a consistent basis. 
However, some staff did acknowledge it as a useful reference document. One PMF Project Team 
respondent suggested that the decision to produce the handbook was made very late (January-
February 2011) and that it should have been considered much earlier. 
Underlying some of the concerns with the communications process are the tensions among some 
PMF Project Team and National managers about the extent to which the PMF should have been a 
strategic or operational framework, and the associated debate as to the merit of the scorecards  
(see Chapter 3).
2.3 Summary
• The communication process underpinning the implementation of the PMF appears to have been 
effective in raising awareness to varying degrees within the organisation. Several concerns were 
raised by PMF Project Team and National managers about the communication process, including a 
lack of appropriate resources, capacity building and engagement of frontline staff. 
• Several methods of communication (e.g. presentations, emails, team meetings) as well as 
different interpretations of the PMF supporting materials were used by different staff. Below 
District level the communication process was inconsistent and contingent, depending on whether 
individual managers thought that operational staff needed to know about the whole PMF or just 
the specific changes that impacted on their roles.
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3 Awareness and understanding
3.1 Rationale and objectives
The rationale for the development of a new Performance Management Framework (PMF) resulted 
from a widespread belief within Jobcentre Plus that the old suite of targets had functioned with 
varying degrees of success but were no longer effective. In particular, they were thought to variously 
lead to perverse behaviours, were expensive to maintain and led to confused lines of accountability 
(Department for Work and Pensions 2011). 
As such, the design statement which outlines the PMF suggests that:
‘…[t]here	is	widespread	agreement	on	the	need	to	move	towards	a	more	intelligent	performance	
management	framework,	with	fewer	central	targets,	and	which	focuses	on	the	outcomes	that	
matter	most	to	the	department,	namely	jobs	and	efficient	and	effective	benefit	delivery.’	
This context set the broad objectives for the design of the new PMF as being to:
• align Jobcentre Plus performance management with the refocused role of DWP (e.g. with the 
development of the new Business Planning process to replace the Comprehensive Spending 
Review and Public Service Agreement process);
• emphasise the core role of Jobcentre Plus as being to help customers move from benefits into 
work and to deliver benefits efficiently;
• emphasise outcomes over processes;
• make performance management more efficient and streamlined throughout the organisation;
• improve external transparency and accountability; and
• support operational delivery and the increased flexibility in Jobcentre Directorate.
An analysis of some of the key documents associated with the development of the PMF suggests a 
broad consistency of objectives from the beginning of the project through to the communication of the 
new framework to operational staff (see Appendix C). Within this broad consistency there are a small 
number of differences in the way in which the PMF objectives were represented, which are mainly 
related to audience (i.e. analysts, managers, operational staff). There is a strong sense of continuity 
between the objectives set for the PMF Project Team and those communicated to operational staff 
about the finished product. This is despite the clear implication in the End of Project Report (PMF Project 
Team 2011) that the purity of the initial objectives had been diluted due to problems in the relationship 
between the PMF Project Team and Jobcentre Plus national management.
Perhaps the most detailed expressions of the way in which the PMF was intended to influence staff 
behaviour in practice are set out in the Operational Delivery Executive Team (ODET) note of August 
2011 (ODET 2011) and the Performance Management Framework Handbook (Strategic Planning and 
Assurance Division and Operational Performance, Planning and Change 2011), the latter of which 
runs to 62 pages. The ODET note provides staff with an understanding not just of the PMF, but, 
crucially, how it is to be interpreted. In particular it makes a firm commitment that: 
• sites (e.g. individual Jobcentres, Benefit Centres or Contact Centres) and Districts will not be ranked 
on the basis of performance;
• the focus now is on the quality of service delivery and outcomes, rather than meeting process and 
activity targets; 
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• there will be no ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to an immediate decline in performance, without fully 
understanding the causal dynamics; and
• performance will be interpreted in a more holistic way, with greater operational flexibility and 
greater support for performance improvement.
The PMF Handbook (SPAD and OPPC 2011) provides an in-depth introduction to the PMF and the 
rationale behind it. It contains discussion of the outcome and supporting measures, their purpose 
and construction as well as the detailed ways in which they are measured. It also crucially includes 
details of how to interpret the data produced under each measure. The PMF handbook is ideally 
suited to staff at all levels of the organisation who want to better understand the PMF and what to 
do in response to different types of performance information. 
One area where the objectives for the PMF evolved relates to the initial emphasis on	'…driving	
better	outcomes,	especially	around	securing,	retaining and progressing in employment…' (emphasis 
added). It is notable that this commitment to sustaining employment and career progression does 
not subsequently feature in any of the other documents. This relates to a strategic decision taken 
over the summer of 2010 that the new PMF did not need to measure Jobcentre Plus against the 
sustainability of employment (DWP 2011b).
Participants were asked to discuss their perception of the rationale for a new PMF. The first and 
most important point to note here, as throughout this section, is that few operational managers 
and staff at site level were fully aware of the PMF in its entirety. These staff tended to understand 
only the very specific element of the PMF that related to their own role. The findings which follow 
are therefore based either on those staff that understood the PMF as a whole or on respondents’ 
understanding of the specific elements that relate to their own role. For their part, OPPC respondents 
tended to be more aware of the PMF as a whole in terms of its structure, but some of these 
respondents, like Group and National managers, often relied on assumptions rather than in-depth 
knowledge about the operation of the PMF at site level.
Many respondents across the organisation identified culture change as a major objective for the 
introduction of the PMF. A common theme in these responses was the need to move away from 
the previous system which was seen as overly target-focused and driving an inappropriate cultural 
emphasis on ‘hitting the target but missing the point’. This clearly appealed to a shared sense that 
the previous system was driving an inappropriate emphasis on performance information for its own 
sake:
‘Well	we	had	a	culture,	we	potentially	still	have	a	culture	of	target	orientated	and	driving	the	
business	to	achieve	target…without	always	considering	impact	on	customer…,	we	absolutely	
needed	something	different.’
(National manager: Jobcentre Plus)
	
‘Well	I	think	the	difference	between	it	and	the	old	framework	is	around	the	fact	that	we’re	more	
about	measuring	actual	outcomes	and	the	customer	experience	rather	than	actually	chasing	
targets	the	way	we’ve	been	in	the	past.’
(District-level manager: Jobcentre Directorate)
The best example of this was the previous Intervention Delivery Target (IDT) which measured 
the delivery of specific interventions in Jobcentres. Operational-level respondents in Jobcentres 
confirmed that previously customers were needlessly called into the Jobcentre for interview solely 
on the basis of meeting that target when Adviser time would have been better spent genuinely 
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helping those customers that need it to find employment. This was clearly an inefficient use of 
organisational resources.
In addition, the previous system of producing performance information was thought to be inefficient 
and distracted managers, often because of a lack of clarity and consistency in the messages which 
accompanied it. This was felt by some to mean that short-term variations in performance attracted 
too much attention and led to frequent operational changes that were confusing and diverted 
attention from the delivery of longer-term strategies to improve performance. 
Another specific example of why moving away from the target-focused culture was appropriate 
related to the use of the previous ‘Balanced scorecards’ to rank the performance of sites and 
Districts. Because the previous system measured these sites and Districts in relation to one another, 
there was a continual competitive emphasis in relation to specific indicators, even if target-level 
performance was exceeded. That was felt by some of the PMF Project Team, National, Group 
and District managers to be inappropriate, either because it suggested that the targeted level of 
performance was too low, or because continuing to push for improvements on a narrow range of 
indicators distracted staff from doing other things that were more in line with the twin objectives of 
taking and processing benefit claims accurately and helping customers to get into work.
It was also suggested that shifting away from quantitative targets was increasing the quality and 
effectiveness of service delivery. In Jobcentres that meant spending Adviser time with the right 
people and ensuring that Adviser meetings were useful; and in Contact Centres and Benefit Centres 
that meant focusing on taking and processing claims efficiently and accurately rather than on call 
handling and benefit processing times alone. 
Several other reasons for changing the performance regime were mentioned by a small number of 
National manager respondents. These included promoting greater autonomy and flexibility at an 
operational level; better linking of operational processes to outcomes and responding to the change 
of government. 
3.2 Design
3.2.1 Defining the PMF
The PMF incorporates a number of different elements. Discussion with the PMF Project Team and 
respondents in operational roles highlighted some difference of opinion over precisely which 
performance management tools should be considered to be part of the PMF. The first position 
(belonging in the main to the PMF Project Team) suggests that the PMF is rather tightly drawn and 
includes only the two outcome measures and the supporting dataset of 47 measures. The second 
position (belonging in the main to operational staff at all levels in Jobcentre Plus) is that the PMF is 
rather broader and incorporates all the performance measures and tools used in the organisation.  
Of most contention in this difference of opinion is whether the five scorecards are part of the PMF. 
This tension arises because of the rationale behind the PMF of removing targets and ranking-
type behaviour. Some respondents (especially the PMF Project Team) think that the scorecards 
re-introduce this, thus undermining the PMF. The difference between them and those National 
managers as well as operational staff at District and site level who were more positive about the role 
of scorecards might relate to the variation in their perspective and role in relation to performance 
accountability. For example, the simplification of Jobcentre Plus’s accountability to DWP was 
thought to be highly appropriate but it does not necessarily imply that Jobcentre Plus is able to 
similarly reduce internal operational accountability. This difference of perspective to some extent 
explains the different interpretations of the PMF and what it incorporates. 
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However, the scorecards are not the only aspect of performance management tools and indicators 
that might be part of a more inclusive definition. At an operational level it is clear that a wider 
range of indicators, benchmarks and targets are used informally in the different Directorates and 
sometimes with variation in practice between comparable Districts and sites. This is explored in 
greater detail in Chapter 4 of this report.
3.2.2 The purpose and philosophy of the PMF
General views on the PMF revealed some important differences of perspective which derive from 
respondents’ position in the organisation and specifically their relationship to the process of 
designing and operationalising the PMF. Among the PMF Project Team, there was generally a view 
that the PMF represented a philosophy and general approach to the management of performance 
that has since been diluted or even directly contravened. This perspective is related to the earlier 
point reflecting contention about precisely what counts as integral and external to the PMF. The 
viewpoint is less about what measures are incorporated but how performance data is used. 
The ‘purist’ perspective on this issue saw the ideal design as being the two outcome measures 
which would provide a common framework for understanding the key objectives of Jobcentre Plus. 
This would then be underpinned by the supporting data which managers at various levels of the 
organisational hierarchy could use flexibly to understand their own unit’s contribution to desired 
outcomes. This perspective is typified by frustration among the PMF Project Team at the introduction 
of scorecards, with this critique being particularly related to ranking of organisational units according 
to performance. Within this general critique however, some respondents did acknowledge that 
if such comparison was to happen, the current Red and Green rating of performance against 
benchmark levels was superior and more in line with the philosophy of the PMF than was the 
previous system of ranking against a small number of indicators on a pure performance level.
‘…so	if	they	were	meeting	an	expected	level	of	performance	on	one	thing,	so	they	were	green	on	
that,	they	wouldn’t	get	any	more	credit	for	going	up	to	a	150	per	cent	of	performance	or	200	per	
cent,	they	couldn’t	get	any	more	credit	if	they	were	meeting	the	expected	level	which	the	idea	
then	was	that	they	would	try	and	get	everything	to	green	rather	than	being	able…appear	higher	
in	the	scorecard	just	by	overachieving	on	a	few	things	that	they	were	finding	really	easy.	So	that	
was	quite	a	step	I	think	for	ops	and	that	was	really	positive	and	that	fitted	in	with	kind	of	the	
ethos	of	what	we	were	doing…’
(National manager: OPPC)
While some in the PMF Project Team and National managers clearly saw the introduction of the PMF 
as a missed opportunity to achieve greater cultural change, a more widely-held view suggested that 
the PMF, its overall philosophy, the outcome measures and supporting measures were appropriate. 
Most respondents acknowledged that the cultural transition being attempted by the PMF could only 
be achieved over the long term. To these respondents, the impact of the PMF had been to stimulate 
greater reflection on how performance should be managed across the organisation, even if there 
was still scope for further improvement.
At an operational level there was less reflection on the philosophy and design of the PMF as a 
whole and more discussion of some limited aspects of the general principles, with a strong focus 
on the specific ways in which performance was being managed in that Directorate. In Jobcentre 
Directorate, understanding of the PMF as a whole tended to be limited to District Management level. 
At the operational level, the PMF tended to be understood in a more of a limited way: as related to 
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the removal of specific targets such as the IDT1 and the associated general increase in autonomy 
and flexibility. The PMF was also understood to be related to new ways of measuring performance 
that were not directly part of the PMF but certainly flowed from it, such as the use of cohort lists to 
focus activity on customers reaching various benchmarks in their benefit claim2. Where respondents 
at site level were aware of specific components of the PMF, this tended to be the scorecards. 
However, in contrast to the fears of some in the PMF Project Team, the scorecards did not seem to be 
viewed particularly negatively. Nor did they appear to be having a significant impact on the activities 
of staff. Instead a range of other, associated, measures of behaviour and performance appeared to 
be more important (see Chapters 4 and 5).
In Contact Centres and Benefit Centres the PMF was less well understood than it was in Jobcentres. 
In Contact Centres the prevailing view was that while there had been some change in the way that 
performance is managed this was relatively minor and the primary mechanisms were still related 
to the number of calls fielded and Average Handling Time, with some balancing toward more 
qualitative management (checking of the quality of call handling and data recording). In Benefit 
Centres the prevailing concern was with targets for the processing of ‘pieces of work’ via the Active 
Operations Management (AOM) workload management system. Though respondents had noted 
that there had been a shift in the way that Average Actual Clearance Time was measured from an 
absolute target to a time band, and this was viewed positively, other concerns about work volume 
and office sustainability were more pertinent. 
3.2.3 Outcome measures and target reduction
Across all levels of the organisation, where there was awareness of the two new outcome measures, 
they were generally thought to be appropriate. In particular, the simplification and outcome-focus of 
these headline measures was felt to ‘send the right signal’ about the primary objectives of Jobcentre 
Plus and operationally it was felt to be consistent with the introduction of increased flexibility in 
service delivery in Jobcentre Directorate. 
‘Yeah,	I	mean	getting	people	off	benefit	and	into	work	and	then	you	know	making	sure	we	pay	
things	in	the	right	way	and	don’t	make	mistakes	under	the	error	agenda	is…yeah,	they’re	the	
two	central	things	that	should	always	be	in	front	of	our	mind,	so	a	big	tick	in	the	box	for	that.		
I	think	the	things	beneath	it	and	the	cross	cutters	that	exist	are	right,	and	relevant.’	
(National manager: Jobcentre Plus)
However, among District managers and frontline operational staff in Jobcentre Directorate, there 
were some concerns about the timeliness and availability of data against the off-flow rate measure. 
PMF Project Team respondents contextualised this, confirming that this information is available, 
though operational staff may not all be fully aware of it. 
There was also a widespread agreement that the objective to move to a more streamlined 
performance management regime with less performance targets was appropriate. At all levels of 
the organisation there was an acceptance that it had been too target-focused for too long and 
the sort of cultural shift envisaged by the PMF was desirable. However, not all respondents agreed 
that targets had in fact been reduced. In many respects, this is a semantic issue. Undeniably the 
six headline performance targets have been replaced by just two outcome measures. The previous 
six targets featured, alongside others, in a ‘balanced scorecard’ where they would be applied 
to individual sites and Districts. New scorecards have replaced these and include a selection of 
1 The removal of IDT technically predated the April 2011 roll-out of the PMF, but its removal was 
an early example of the shift toward the thinking that underpinned the PMF.
2 For example, at 13 weeks, 26 weeks and 52 weeks for Jobseeker’s Allowance claims.
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indicators from the PMF supporting data set with minimum expected levels of performance that 
each trigger a Red or Green rating. Performance above the expected level gains a Green rating, but 
additional performance carries no further weight. 
At operational level, some managers translate aspects of the scorecards to measures that they use 
to monitor and incentivise individual staff. To this extent operational managers and staff operate 
in an environment where they have numerically-expressed objectives to achieve even if they are 
not formally called ‘targets’ and are not part of the PMF. In Benefit Centres and Contact Centres in 
particular, among operational staff at site level there was very little appreciation that any targets 
had been removed or reduced, and in Benefit Centres there was perhaps even a tendency to suggest 
that targets had increased with the introduction of a new workflow management process: AOM.
3.2.4 Supporting data/measures and scorecards
The supporting data/measures were perhaps the least well understood component of the PMF. 
Understanding was greatest among OPPC respondents and, as might be expected, the PMF Project 
Team. Some PMF Project Team respondents were concerned that appropriate understanding of the 
supporting data (like the scorecards) required an accompanying narrative and that the lack of this 
meant that operational managers often requested performance information in the ways it was 
previously presented under the targets regime. Others noted that the technical aspects of definitions 
were not always well understood and that different interpretations of these (even implicitly) could 
lead to inappropriate responses to performance data. Understanding was lowest among operational 
staff, who frequently were simply unaware or presumed that the phrase ‘supporting data’ referred 
to the variety of information in the organisation that could be used for performance management 
purposes, but which was not necessarily part of the PMF.
3.3 Summary
Overall, there was:
• A strong connection between the stated objectives of the new PMF and the understanding of a 
wide range of respondents involved in the research. Where staff at all levels of the organisation 
and in all Directorates know about the PMF there appears to be a widely shared and common 
understanding of its purpose as being to drive a cultural change toward outcome-focused 
activities, to be more efficient, customer service oriented and to support flexibility among frontline 
Advisers in Jobcentres. 
• Generally respondents thought that the new PMF was in line with the objectives set for it. 
• In particular, respondents were satisfied that the two outcome measures were an appropriate 
representation of the purpose and objectives of Jobcentre Plus.
• There was some concern however among those that were involved in the PMF Project Team that 
the scorecards were polluting the purity of the initial design. 
• While many respondents at all levels of the organisation recognised the need for culture change, 
this had only partly occurred at the time of the fieldwork. 
• There were clearly cases where operational staff did not feel that there had been any reduction 
in the emphasis on numerical targets, especially in Contact Centres and Benefit Centres, 
though sometimes this related to initiatives other than the PMF such as workflow management 
processes.
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4 Managing performance 
4.1 Data quality
The issue of data quality and staff perceptions of this are crucial to the success of performance 
management initiatives because this conditions the ways in which individuals and teams respond to 
performance signals. One of the most significant problems with the previous headline labour market 
target for Jobcentre Plus (the Job Outcome Target) was that real and/or perceived problems in the 
capture of information about customers entering work led to a collapse of trust in the data (Nunn 
et	al. 2007). As such, participants in this evaluation were asked about their level of trust in the data 
produced under the Performance Management Framework (PMF) and whether they would change 
their own working practices in response to it.
At the National level there was general agreement that the data was robust with two main provisos, 
relating to (i) the off-flow rate indicator and (ii) a smaller number of concerns reported about other 
indicators in the scorecards and supporting data. In particular, there were some concerns about 
the time-lags associated with the availability of nationally-produced off-flow rate data and the 
lack of availability of the ‘into employment’ element of it. On the former point, there may be some 
confusion and lack of awareness that this information is now actually available with a maximum 
seven-day timelag, refreshed every seven days, which was in line with the demands expressed 
by managers. Other smaller concerns were identified by individual respondents such as the way 
that the performance reporting of Benefit Centres are affected by the import and export of work 
between them, and others raised general concerns about data quality without specifying individual 
measures/indicators that they were concerned about. 
At District level, Jobcentre respondents’ main concern was also the perception of a time-lag in 
the outcome data but they appeared to be less concerned about the lack of ‘into employment’ 
information. The perceived time-lag meant that District-level respondents reported that they found 
it hard to manage performance in real time. It had also led to several Districts implementing their 
own processes for tracking off-flows.
Interestingly, at a more operational level, Advisers and Adviser team managers (ATMs) were less 
concerned about the lack of up-to-date centrally-produced data and were instead focused on 
using cohort lists and local tracking data to understand their individual and collective performance. 
In some cases this tracking data was derived from District-level data capture, in others site-level 
tracking using the Labour Market System (LMS) and in some cases individual Adviser-level collation 
of caseload and LMS data to produce off-flow information. In a small number of cases this resulted 
in duplication of effort, and there were examples where this activity was undertaken at all three 
levels. In some places tracking was augmented by individual Advisers ‘chasing destinations’ to check 
what happened to customers after leaving benefit.
Keeping individual and office-level records was partly a pragmatic response to a (perceived) lack of 
timely off-flow rate data, but it was also discussed by some respondents as partly a result of their 
insecurity about future changes of emphasis in management practices or inaccurate centrally-
produced information. In aggregate this suggests that there is widespread duplication of national 
data production, which is now available on a weekly basis, though few respondents appeared to 
be aware of this at the time of the fieldwork. This is clearly inefficient but it also suggested that 
individual staff and managers were seriously engaging with a cultural change away from an 
emphasis on interventions and toward an emphasis on outcomes. Nevertheless it will be important 
that awareness and use of the centrally-produced data improves and that local duplication of data 
reduces in the future.
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4.2 Management of performance 
The new PMF appears to be the main mechanism for understanding the performance of Jobcentre 
Plus. It is being used from Chief Executive downwards in mainly monthly meetings to discuss 
performance at National, Group, District and site level. As such, the PMF is being used to coordinate 
discussions around performance using a broadly-aligned and consistent set of information. 
As proximity to operations increases, so does the propensity to use the various scorecards, with 
Group Delivery Network (GDN) scorecards being used at that level and the operational scorecards 
used at site and District level. One respondent suggested that the GDN scorecard had helped to 
bring more parity to performance discussions between the different Directorates and had impacted 
favourably on, for example, customer experience and productivity. Discussions of performance at 
site level often drew on a range of information sources, with the PMF influencing practice to varying 
degrees across the three Directorates and most noticeably in Jobcentres. 
4.2.1 Jobcentre Directorate
In Jobcentres at site level, ATMs use ‘cohort lists’ and Adviser caseloads as one of the main tools for 
managing performance, though there was significant variation between Districts in the extent to 
which these had fully replaced activity-based measures such as the Interventions Delivery Target. 
In all Districts and sites, Advisers had caseloads of customers from the beginning of a customer’s 
claim. In combination with cohort lists of customers approaching one of the off-flow milestones 
(e.g. for Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants these are 13, 26 and, 52 weeks), ATMs focus on Adviser 
off-flow performance in relation to these caseloads. In some offices, ATMs interpret the scorecard 
benchmark ‘level to be achieved’ as an explicit team or individual ‘target’, which approximates to 
the ‘off-flow rate’ measure; i.e. Adviser’s are given a target of the proportion of those that flow onto 
their caseload that must result in an off-flow by each milestone. 
In all Districts, ATMs have at least monthly conversations with Advisers based on these cohort lists, 
set against the Adviser’s caseload. These conversations tended to take each customer approaching 
a milestone, focusing on what had been done with them already, what plans the Adviser/customer 
had to progress and the Adviser’s best approximation of when the customer would off-flow in their 
‘customer journey’. These ‘caseload conferences’ also served as a mechanism for Advisers to gain 
support or mentoring in relation to challenging customers and for the sharing of knowledge about 
available support and provision for customers and labour market opportunities. Taken at face value 
this process definitely appeared to be consistent with the idea of personalised support for individual 
customers, based around their unique needs and circumstances, with the clear and shared objective 
of moving customers off benefits as rapidly as possible. This was the main area in which there was 
evidence that the PMF was influencing how Jobcentre Plus resources are allocated and re-allocated 
to meet organisational demands. 
Beyond the use of cohort lists and caseload management, there was considerable variation between 
different Districts in the way that Advisers were managed in the new system. In one District this 
was based almost solely on outcome data, to another District where activity-based measures were 
clearly still used to measure performance. In the third District in the sample, practice appeared to be 
between these two opposite ends of the spectrum (see Figure 4.1). However, given the small sample 
size in this evaluation, this suggests only that management practice in this respect is currently 
varied along a spectrum. 
Variation was apparent in other ways too. While caseloads and cohort lists were routinely prioritised 
in all Districts, the criteria by which this was undertaken appeared to vary across and within Districts. 
For some respondents this was clearly a process of targeting help towards those who need it most, 
whereas for others it appeared that a more pragmatic consideration of the potential for generating 
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an off-flow (albeit quicker than without an intervention) was a criterion for prioritisation. At the 
same time, this related to identifying those customers facing substantial barriers to labour market 
entry and the consideration of referral options, for example to providers or early entry to the Work 
Programme. In other cases, a small number of Advisers spoke of prioritising customers immediately 
before they are referred to the Work Programme in an attempt to achieve an off-flow at that stage. 
Advisers also explained that customer prioritisation was dynamic. Customers initially thought to 
not require help for example, might subsequently be prioritised if they had not found work by the 
time they approached a particular milestone. The dynamics of this in relation to the labour market 
were discussed by several Advisers who suggested that once realistic job aspirations for jobseekers 
become difficult to attain, customer confidence declines and this makes Adviser intervention crucial 
to supporting the transition back to work.
Figure 4.1 Spectrum of Adviser Performance Management under the PMF
4.2.2 Contact Centre Directorate
In relation to Contact Centres, there was some variation in the extent to which the PMF had 
transformed practice. Several PMF Project Team and National managers expressed some scepticism 
about whether the PMF had actually changed performance management practices at GDN and 
site level because of the range of alternative and real-time performance information available to 
managers in the Contact Centres. Respondents at the Group level articulated different views about 
the role and use of the PMF. Some Group-level managers thought that the GDN scorecard had made 
it easier to have a dialogue across the network about performance issues. They suggested that this 
had resulted in improved collaboration between the Directorates. Others highlighted the virtual 
nature of Contact Centres and reported that this made it difficult to have a conversation about how 
site- and District-level performance for Contact Centres fed into wider achievement of organisational 
objectives.
Outcome-based practice
• Advisers measured via 
 cohort lists, case-loads 
 and off-ﬂow performance.
• Individual Adviser’s given 
 targets for off-ﬂow rates.
Hybrid practice
• Managers measured via 
 cohort lists and case 
 load plus activity-based 
 measures such as time 
 spent with customers.
Activity-based practice
• Advisers managed via  
 activity-based  
 measures such as  
 number of referrals, job  
 submissions, time  
 spent with customers  
 and Mandatory Work-
 Related Activity (MWRA)  
 referrals/sanctions.
• Unclear whether  
 individual targets set.
 
Spectrum of practice
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At site level, scorecards were mainly used by some managers to compare their site’s performance 
with that of others. Some managers regularly forwarded these to their team leaders, while others 
did not. The overwhelming amount of alternative information available to individual telephony staff 
and team leaders on a day-to-day basis was cited as the reason for controlling distribution of PMF-
related data:
‘They	know	all	about	the	AHT,	they	know	about	the	PMF	results,	they	know	about	the	MPP	
Maximising	People	Performance	results.	I	don’t	always	send	them	the	scorecard	information	
because	I	think	it	could	be	too	much.	They	do	need	to	know	it.	I	believe	I	do	randomly	send	it	
out	but	not	every	month,	I	put	my	hands	up	to	that	because	sometimes	they	get	too	much.’
(Operational manager: Contact Centre Directorate)
In order to understand and manage performance within the site, Contact Centre managers were 
clear that they used a range of much more up-to-date information derived from the telephony 
technology. This enables up-to-the-minute recording of staff activity, call handling times and call 
resolution. As such, within sites at team leader or Customer Service Adviser (CSA) level there was 
very little consideration of scorecard information, other than in relation to the persistent fear that 
some Centres would be selected for closure and that comparative performance on scorecard metrics 
would be a factor in this decision.3
This is not to say, however, that the up-to-the-minute information used to manage performance 
is inconsistent with the PMF, just that the source of the data, its presentation and discussion is not 
necessarily derived from the PMF supporting data or the scorecards. An example of this is managers 
scrutinising the proportion of calls that result in a handover to a Benefit Centre. This is not data in 
the scorecard but does have a direct relationship to the call resolution measure in the scorecard.
Within Contact Centres, there was some evidence of changing practice in relation to performance 
management, although it was not always clear that this resulted from the introduction of the 
PMF. In all three sites visited there was a recognition that the attention and emphasis given to the 
AHT indicator had reduced slightly and had been balanced with a range of other measures such 
as Call Resolution, Calls Answered, proportion of time spent by CSAs on different types of activity 
and Average Working Days Lost. In addition, in all three sites, there was an acknowledgement that 
quantitative metrics were balanced by a variety of qualitative checks on CSA activity at both national 
and local level. 
‘The	old	system…I	felt	these	are	targets	and	by	hook	or	by	crook	meet	them	regardless	of	what	
went	on	underneath,	perverse	behaviours	as	I’ve	touched	on,	forgetting	the	customer	in	this.	
This	seemed	to	just	disappear	somewhere,	it	was	actually	there’s	people	on	the	phone	that	we	
should	be	trying	to	help	rather	than	get	them	off	the	phone,…because	we’ve	got	an	average	
handling	time	to	meet.	And	although	the	quality	side	of	things	has	always	been	there,	it	seemed	
to	have	a	less	impact,	or	a	less	important	role	[in the past].…We’ve	done	a	lot	more	listening	
to	all	types	of	calls	that	our	staff	take,	to	make	sure	that	it’s	not	just	the	ones	that	have	got	
decision	outcomes,	looking	at	shorter	calls	as	well	to	try	and	drive	out	any	perverse	behaviours	
that	might	be	there	as	well.’	
(Operational manager: Contact Centre Directorate)
3 There is a current planned programme of Benefit Centre and Contact Centre closure. This 
relates to 17 Benefit Centres and five Contact Centres between 2011/13.
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‘I	think	it’s	because	we’re	not	constantly	going	on	about	AHT	all	the	time	like	before	it	was	just	
constant	and	constant	and	every	week	it	was	“why	have	you	not	achieved	this	week?”…So	I	
think	when	the	pressure’s	off	it’s	more	psychological	but	you	end	up	probably	achieving	because	
you’re	not	thinking	about	it	as	much.	They	do	spend	more	time	with	the	customers	now	when	
they	ask	them	questions	at	the	end	of	the	call	and	things	like	that,	which	might	have	probably	
impacted	on	AHT	slightly	but	as	long	as	there	are	reasons…that’s	all	we	can	do	really.’
(Operational manager: Contact Centre Directorate)
These checks elicited a variety of responses. For some participants, they were a visible sign that 
metrics such as AHT were balanced by a focus on the quality of the customer experience. For 
others, national ‘PMF checks’ on adherence to script were overly stringent and resulted in low 
scores for even the smallest deviation from the script. These ‘PMF checks’, undertaken by a central 
team, were augmented by Call Evaluation Framework checks undertaken by team leaders in the 
sites themselves. These checks were thought to be more relevant because they focused on the 
information entered by CSAs and therefore were likely to affect a customer’s benefit claim and 
contribute to the achievement of the Monetary Value of Fraud and Error measure. 
While the rebalancing toward a more qualitative emphasis was welcomed by team leaders and 
CSAs, it was suggested that AHT remained the most important measure by which CSA and team-
level performance was judged. 
‘Every	call	we	take,	well	how	long	have	I	been	on,…there	is	still	that	target	there,	there’s	the	
seventeen	minutes	ten,	while	that	is	still	there,…it’s	still	given	the	importance	that	it	should	be,	
because	it	is	still	a	target…but,	there’s	slightly	less	of	a	focus	on	that…I	would	say	that	I	feel		
less	pressure.’
(Frontline operational staff: Contact Centre Directorate)
However, there appeared to be some degree of local variation in the amount of time set for 
expected performance against the AHT, with respondents in one site reporting that this had recently 
increased by around a minute. The increase in time for handling calls, various changes to the 
required script and the rebalancing toward qualitative performance management were generally 
welcomed by staff respondents, including CSAs, team leaders and Centre managers. 
Whether these changes in practice in Contact Centres resulted from the introduction of the PMF 
or other initiatives is unclear. In some cases, the changes seemed to pre-date the PMF and to be 
associated with other projects (the ‘AHT Challenge’), while in other cases the introduction of both 
types of quality checks seemed to come significantly after the introduction of the PMF.
4.2.3 Benefit Centre Directorate 
In Benefit Centres the way in which performance is managed varies at different organisational 
levels and in each site from team to team. At site and Group level, the scorecard was clearly the key 
mechanism. Site- and Group-level managers suggested that discussions about the performance of 
their site focus on the full range of indicators in the scorecard rather than just the Average Actual 
Clearance Time (AACT) indicator, as might have been the case in the past (although this is still 
actively monitored). However, within sites, the management indicators used to judge different 
teams vary on the basis of their specific functions. For example, Benefit Processing teams appeared 
to be less concerned with management information and performance indicators than with workflow 
management and, in particular, the Active Operations Management system. In some Centres and 
Teams, daily ‘buzz’ meetings were used to discuss progress on workflow, while in other Centres 
and Teams performance was discussed in weekly meetings with comparative data introduced on a 
monthly basis when scorecards are available. 
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One National manager also noted that there were (or had been) problems in the allocation of 
cleared work to sites in terms of clearance times and the various associated time bands on 
the scorecard, such that those sites importing work had their work clearances reported to the 
exporting site. It is clear that a balanced approach to interpreting comparative performance on 
benefit processing clearance times and associated measures is needed where workflow is also 
being adjusted between Benefit Centre sites so that volumes are taken into account when judging 
clearance times.
Other staff in Benefit Centres had their performance measured in different ways. For example, in one 
site Decision Makers suggested that the main mechanism for managing their work was the Decision 
Making and Appeals Case Recorder which collates data on the time taken to reach decisions. While 
data for Decision Maker activity appeared to be derived from a separate system or administrative 
method, and therefore may not feed directly into the scorecard, it is clear that by managing the 
time taken to clear decisions there is a contribution to AACT.
4.3 Changes to organisational structures 
There have been considerable changes to the organisational structures underpinning performance 
management during the development and implementation of the PMF. Research participants were 
asked to comment on the ways in which the PMF might have affected the relationship between 
different parts of Jobcentre Plus and the ways in which the creation of Operational Performance, 
Planning and Change Division (OPPC) in early 2011, and the re-organisation of performance 
reporting and performance improvement functions of Jobcentre Plus, might have impacted on 
performance management.
In relation to links between the different directorates in Jobcentre Plus, there was a broad split 
between respondents with a national or Group-level perspective (especially those in OPPC or an 
analytical role) and operational staff at District level in the three Directorates. The first group saw 
the GDN scorecard (usually referred to as the ‘Customer Journey scorecard’) as a potential driver of 
greater collaboration and shared perspective on the customer experience as a whole rather than a 
silo-type performance measurement of each of the three Directorates.
‘It	became	apparent	between	myself	and	my	Benefit	colleague…he	was	aware	that	the	
handover	rates	were	going	up…because	we	were	looking	at	it	together,	at	least	once	a	month	
it	was	apparent	to	us	much,	much	quicker	that	it	wasn’t	working….As	a	whole	area	we	raised	
it	nationally	both	within	our	streams	of	specialisms	but	also	collectively	as	a	group	delivery	
network.	Then	we	got	very,	very	quickly	national	attention…under	the	previous	system	it	would	
have	taken	18	months	before	that	would	have	been	spotted…we	would	have	just	thought	“oh	
it	is	a	Contact	Centre	problem”	or	“it	is	a	Benefit	Centre	problem”	but	this	PMF	enabled	us	to	see	
that	actually	it	is	not.’
(Group-level manager: Contact Centre Directorate)
Notwithstanding this example, a number of participants (mainly those that had been part of the PMF 
Project Team) still thought that considerably more could be done to facilitate collaborative working 
between the Directorates. Indeed this was one of those issues that the establishment of scorecards 
was held to work against. 
The second group of respondents, typically at District level and below reported mixed findings. Few 
could identify concrete examples of how the PMF had assisted in strengthening the relationship or 
practical examples of a more shared – ‘end to end’ – perspective. Among these responses some 
thought that (pre-existing) issue escalation procedures had helped to reduce problems while 
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others suggested that a degree of suspicion remained between the three Directorates. Given 
that this evaluation has not found major changes in the way that Contact Centres are managing 
performance, it is not surprising to find that Benefit Centre participants did not suggest a major 
improvement or otherwise in the information passed through to them from Contact Centres.
The successive re-organisation of OPPC attracted relatively few comments from respondents. This 
is mainly because of the relatively small number of respondents in the fieldwork that were in a 
position to comment, and because of the recent nature of the changes. At the time of the fieldwork, 
the first round of changes to OPPC had been in place for around eight months and a second round 
of changes were being undertaken as part of the DWP Transformation. To the extent that they did 
attract comments, District managers expressed some marginal regret that they had less direct 
control of the production of performance data for their District, though it appeared that they were 
still able to get the support that they required in most cases. OPPC respondents themselves were 
broadly positive about the various changes in structure, although many had recently changed 
jobs and were unable to offer substantive evidence of the improvements they hoped would result. 
An example here is that several OPPC respondents mentioned that the sharing of good practice 
and investigation of poor performance was now undertaken more on a national basis and could 
therefore generalise learning much more quickly. However, no concrete instances of this were 
highlighted. 
4.4 Summary
• The PMF is being used to structure performance management at all levels of the organisation, 
though scorecards are widely seen as the ‘face’ of the PMF at operational levels. Frontline staff 
tend to understand the management of their performance according to the specific interpretation 
of the PMF/scorecards taken by their line manager. In many cases this is not presented or 
rationalised as being part of the ‘PMF’ and is also frequently driven by the consideration of 
alternative (though mostly consistent) information. This suggests that managerial interpretation 
of the PMF is crucial to its implementation and the achievement of the culture change desired. 
• Some respondents, especially at District level in Jobcentre Directorate lacked an awareness of 
the full range of available outcome information and clearly indicated that having this information 
would assist them in managing performance. 
• In Jobcentres there is significant local-level data collection and duplication in this activity. While 
this is inefficient and in some cases resulted from a lack of trust or awareness of centrally-
produced data, it may also be driving local operational ownership of the process of culture change 
which the PMF is aiming for.
• In Jobcentres, the introduction of the PMF has affected Adviser roles significantly. This is 
particularly driven by the removal of Intervention Delivery Target, the introduction of increased 
flexibility and the use of caseload management, prioritisation and cohort lists to manage the 
performance of individual Advisers. 
• There is difference in practice between Districts. Some Districts offered more flexibility to Advisers 
than others where informal activity-based targets were in use.
• Though many respondents suggested that case conferencing and qualitative measures of Adviser 
performance are now undertaken widely, there is reason to be cautious about the extent to which 
these practices are embedded and will be sustained over the medium to longer term.
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• In Contact Centres the major shift that has occurred alongside the introduction of the PMF is 
that from the measurement of AHT to a range of additional quantitative measures and more 
qualitative processes for managing performance. It was not always clear, though, that these 
changes were the direct result of the introduction of the PMF. 
• In Benefit Centres the new scorecards may have driven a declining emphasis on the AACT 
measure and in particular reducing perverse incentives that previously operated in the way that 
AACT was operated. However, the major concern among respondents appeared to be related to 
the introduction of a new workflow management system rather than the PMF.
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5 Motivation and behaviour
5.1 Motivation
A key theme in the evaluation related to the way in which the Performance Management Framework 
(PMF) may have changed the performance signals and motivation for individual members of staff, 
particularly at operational level.
5.1.1 National level
At a national level, three sets of views emerged, though these were mainly based on assumptions 
and anticipated consequences rather than hard evidence. The first was that the removal of targets 
for individuals might lead to a loss of motivation, although as documented below, this appears to be 
largely unfounded. The second was that in contradiction with the expectation and intention behind 
the PMF, the introduction of scorecards had actually seen an increase in performance targets for 
individuals, which created confusing and contradictory incentives. The final set of expectations were 
that the PMF has not really ‘touched anybody personally’; in other words, it hadn’t substantially 
altered the incentives for individual staff. Despite these different expectations, it was widely thought 
that there would have been more impact in Jobcentre Directorate than in Contact and Benefit 
Centres. 
5.1.2 Jobcentre Directorate
Advisers generally appreciated the move to increased flexibility and autonomy, and found this 
motivating and satisfying. This was especially the case in the District that had implemented greater 
flexibility at the Adviser level:
‘I	would	say	more	[flexibility]	because	it’s	allowing	me	to	use	my	skills	and	experience	how	I	see	
fit,	and	it’s	okay,	I	should	be	asked	to	justify	myself	occasionally…I	don’t	find	it’s	a	hindrance.’	
(Frontline operational staff: Jobcentre Directorate)
However, a number of respondents in two of the sample Districts suggested that it would take some 
time for these practices to become embedded and it appeared as if it was still early in the change 
process. While most Advisers welcomed the increased flexibilities, some were uncertain about how 
to respond. In the third District a rather different approach appeared to be in use, based much more 
on activity-based monitoring and targets, with individual Advisers discussing Decision Making and 
Appeals (DMA) and referrals targets specifically. 
‘I	don’t	think	when	you	speak	to	them	they	will	feel	they	haven’t	got	targets	they	still	have	to	get	
people	into	work	and…they’ve	still	got	Adapt…that’s	just	to	measure	how	many	people	they’re	
seeing…I	still	look	at	DMA	we	still	have	to	do	conditionality	[testing] and	it’s	hard,	we	keep	
being	threatened	put	people	on	the	Pips	you	know…my	boss	expects	us	to	put	them	on	testing	
conditionality…’	
(Operational manager: Jobcentre Directorate)
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‘Yeah,	well	it	can	be	anything	[that is articulated as an informal local target].	It	can	be	the	
number	of	referrals	to	the	flexible	support	fund	grant	for	example.	It	could	be	the	number	
of	referrals	to	the	Work	Programme	by	a	particular	category	of	customer,	for	example	ESA	
[Employment Support Allowance],	so	there’s	all	different	targets	that	seem	to	be	coming	down	
at	different	stages.	Sometimes	the	goalposts	seem	to	be	moving,	the	criteria	moving	and	it’s	
difficult	to	keep	up	with	that.’
(Frontline operational staff: Jobcentre Directorate)
Here motivation appeared to be negatively affected by a continuation of process-type targets in 
both offices visited in the District. Equally, one of the barriers to embracing change appeared to be 
a suspicion that process targets such as the Interventions Delivery Target would be brought back at 
a later date and that Advisers and Adviser team managers might be reproached retrospectively for 
not maintaining previously expected interventions.
Another minor concern about the impact of the PMF on Jobcentre staff motivation was in relation 
to Assistant Advisers, whereby a very small number of respondents suggested that these staff may 
be de-motivated by the loss of process targets associated with their role and the more tangential 
connection between their work and outcome targets.
5.1.3 Contact Centre Directorate
In Contact Centres, the main motivational issues were related to pressure regarding call volumes, 
Average Handling Times (AHT) and call resolutions. That said, across all three sites, participants 
reported that this was less pressured than previously because the AHT expected level of performance 
had been increased in all sites, although to varying degrees between sites and teams; and because 
the emphasis had shifted more toward a range of indicators including call resolution. The main 
motivational factors were thought to be outside of the PMF and related to future organisational 
changes, efficiency drives and the potential for office closure. In particular, on the latter issue, this 
meant that the extent to which staff were concerned with the PMF, it was to see where their site 
was placed in the scorecard. This is despite the clear sense that they disliked the way in which the 
previous Balanced scorecard was used:
‘We	then	bring	in	the	new	PMF	and	we	say	all	measurement	to	that	extent	has	gone;	the	
balanced	scorecard	does	not	drive	a	top,	middle	and	bottom,	but	it	actually	kind	of	still	does	
because	if	you	have	more	greens	then	you’re	at	the	top.	If	you…had	a	lot	of	reds	then	you’re	not	
doing	quite	so	well.	The	really	weird	thing	is	staff	still	like	to	know	where	they	are,	they	still	like	
to	know	that	their	site	is	up	there	or	if	not,	why	not?	That’s	the	strangest	thing,	they	wanted	that	
gone,	and	now	that’s	gone	they	still	like	to	rate	themselves,	we’ve	got	more	greens	than	them	
so	it	means	we	must	be	first,	so	weird!’
(Group-level manager: Contact Centre Directorate)
Operational staff in Contact Centres suggested that a range of motivations are in operation. For 
some, performance and management information are clearly motivational and incentivise effort, 
leading to a sense of satisfaction, whereas others cite different motivations such as ‘doing the job 
well’. The motivation of the first group was unaffected by the introduction of the PMF because of 
the widespread availability and use of alternative performance information from the telephony 
technology. For example, one Customer Service Agent respondent who was characteristic of this 
first group was critical of a recent agreement with the trade union that performance information 
would only be discussed with staff on a fortnightly basis, rather than being available on a daily or 
weekly basis. The second group, on the other hand, were pleased about the influence of the PMF on 
the introduction of qualitative checks (Call Evaluation Framework) and their increasing importance, 
and this had a marginal positive effect on their motivation. This group felt that this balanced the 
influence of more quantitative performance management.
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5.1.4 Benefit Centre Directorate 
In Benefit Centres staff motivation was affected more by workflow management processes through 
the Active Operations Management (AOM). This was felt to be negative by the majority who 
commented on it, especially as a result of continually rising expectations about workflow. Some 
Group-level respondents suggested that for them, the PMF had been motivational by presenting 
a shared understanding of common performance concerns across the Group Delivery Network. 
Nevertheless, at site level the issue of importing work clearly has an implication for motivation and 
performance.
The tension between achieving high levels of performance which then results in increased 
workloads is a factor influencing staff motivation. On the one hand, some participants queried why 
initial expectations should be exceeded when that would result in importing additional work from 
other offices. Others suggested that the importation of work from other offices was particularly 
negative, where this resulted in them getting behind on their ‘own’ work. Indeed, one respondent 
commented that it was ironic that on the Benefit Centre scorecard their office was ‘ranked’ lower 
than another office from whom they had regularly imported large volumes of complicated work.  
A related concern was that staff did not fully understand the figures produced by the AOM process, 
in particular the weighting of work, meaning that at times they perhaps over-estimated how much 
work was outstanding and being imported.
5.2 Problems and perverse incentives
5.2.1 General problems and perverse incentives
Several general problems are apparent with the use of performance management in Public 
Employment Services (PESs) (Bouckaert and Peters 2002; Bruttel 2004; Bruttel 2005; Bouckaert et	al. 
2010; Nunn et	al. 2010). These include the costs associated with producing performance information 
exceeding the benefits associated with it; the production of poor quality data that doesn’t serve 
as an effective basis for decision making and the production of ‘negative externalities’ by pursuing 
organisational objectives that result in negative social, economic or environmental impacts. Box 
2 shows some common problems in PES performance management and the ways in which they 
could potentially occur in the PMF. It could be argued that performance targets have previously led 
to examples of each of these in Jobcentre Plus in the past (Johnson and Nunn 2005; Johnson and 
Nunn 2006; Nunn 2007). The following discussion investigates these in relation to the PMF.
As discussed above, the PMF data was broadly trusted by managers with the caveat that the off-
flow rate into employment element of the measure was unavailable at the time of the fieldwork 
and there are perceptions of timelags in receiving ‘official’ nationally collated off-flow rate data. 
This is leading to the duplication of data collection in relation to off-flows. The second way in 
which the balance between data cost, quality and trust issues arose, despite their not being 
directly explored, was in relation to Benefit Centre/Contact Centre performance management and 
workflow management. It was clear that in the former case the AOM system had a big part to 
play in measuring workflow/productivity and that in Contact Centres a range of up-to-the-minute 
performance information derived from the telephony equipment was being used to measure 
operational performance. These three examples suggest that there is a need to further explore 
issues of data production costs and utility, and the extent and costs of performance information 
duplication or benefit in any future research on this topic.
While not formally explored in this research, one possible negative externality that could be related 
to the PMF flows from not currently having the ‘into employment’ element in the data at the time of 
the fieldwork. One potential implication of this, and the clear emphasis on off-flows in Jobcentres, 
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is that customers may be encouraged to take very short-term/low-quality employment that would 
not be in their interests because it would fail to build any real work experience, while disrupting 
their benefit claim. Such short-term/low-quality employment might also be an administrative cost 
to Jobcentre Plus in claim closure and re-claim, without generating substantial savings in benefit 
payments. It may also have a negative economic cost in the sense of being a disincentive to 
employers to invest in serious job creation. However, job sustainability and progression is seen as 
beyond the scope of PMF, partly because it is seen as outside of the policy remit of Jobcentre Plus. 
This reflects the policy emphasis on any job being a positive outcome. The removal of sustainability 
and progression from the objectives for the PMF is characteristic of this. Despite this, the PMF 
includes a ‘churn’ indicator which appears partly designed to avoid this. This indicator though was 
not well known about among operational staff and few mentioned it. There was no actual evidence 
of encouraging customers to sign-off benefits for such very poor quality work, but, it is equally true 
to say that the ‘churn’ indicator is unlikely to guard against this, given its low profile.
Box 2 Common problems in PES Performance Management and possibilities 
for these in the PMF
General
• Costs – performance information is 
expensive to produce. The costs of this may 
outweigh the benefits associated with it.
• Negative externalities – performance 
targets may incite organisational behaviour 
which creates problems external to it. 
In the case of PESs this might include 
inappropriate job submissions, referrals, 
discouragement of jobseekers or demand/
supply matching problems. 
• Poor quality data – the production of data 
that is inappropriate for making decisions 
or that managers and stakeholders do not 
trust. 
In Jobcentres
• Customer prioritisation – selecting jobseekers 
who can help themselves for interventions and 
de-selecting jobseekers who require help.
• Sanctions – one way of producing off-flows 
from benefit is through sanctioning jobseekers, 
who subsequently count as a further on-flow.
• Benefit shifting – another noted way of 
producing off-flows or reducing the claimant 
count for a particular benefit is through shifting 
claimants from one benefit to another.
• Purchasing performance – the generation 
of an unnecessary intervention to ‘claim’ 
performance ‘points’. 
• Performance information duplication – the 
duplication of information at several levels 
of the organisation in order to monitor 
information. 
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Box 2 Continued
In Benefit Centres
• ‘Parking’ long-running cases – putting 
pieces of work to one side where they will 
take a long time or have already exceeded 
milestone targets for processing, or simply 
prioritising easy cases. 
• Export of difficult cases – workflow 
management might allow Centres to 
manage their workflow so that difficult 
cases are not processed and instead are 
exported to others. 
• Just meeting objectives/slow down – 
productivity targets might induce doing just 
enough and working slow so that additional 
expectation/work is not generated. 
• Incorrect payments/processes – if one 
process is more difficult or time consuming 
than another, this may result in incorrect 
payments or processes being followed. 
In Contact Centres
• Call dumping to reduce call times – productivity 
targets might lead to CSAs ‘dropping’ calls to 
reduce average call times. 
•	 Selective	data	entry/corner	cutting – missing 
particular aspects of data collection because it 
is difficult or time consuming. 
• Customers offered too much information – 
excessive time might induce CSAs to try to help 
customers too much by providing advice on 
issues beyond their capacity. 
5.2.2 Problems and perverse incentives in Jobcentres
Previous research has suggested that some of the common problems in PES performance 
management have also been present in Jobcentre Plus in the past. For example, research has 
suggested that the inappropriate prioritisation of jobseekers for intervention may have been a 
feature in the first phase of Employment Zones in the United Kingdom (Bruttel 2005) and previous 
regimes (e.g. the explicit weights pilots, the Job Entry Target (JET) and the Job Outcome Target 
(JOT)) were designed to prevent this from happening in Jobcentre Plus (Nunn 2010). Benefit shifting 
may also have been responsible for the initial rise in inactive benefit claimants during the 1980s and 
1990s (Nunn et	al. 2006). The generation of unnecessary interventions was also a noted problem 
in the previous JET regime and part of the rationale for the shift to the JOT system was to remove 
these incentives (Johnson and Nunn 2006). To some extent or other all these potential problems 
were investigated in relation to staff in Jobcentres.
First and foremost in relation to perverse incentives, the removal of the IDT appears to have had a 
substantial and positive impact in reducing unnecessary interventions. In its place, there was no 
evidence that any further unnecessary interventions were being incentivised by the introduction of 
the PMF. As it was described by respondents, this single change may have been responsible for a 
significant reorientation of organisational resources toward more effective and appropriate activity.
The caseload prioritisation process described by several Advisers and ATMs potentially opens up the 
scope for some jobseekers being inappropriately prioritised for intervention. However, most Advisers 
and ATMs interviewed about this suggested that they were very much interested in working with 
customers who need support and there was widespread appreciation of the flexibility to be able to 
prioritise in this way. 
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‘The Adviser makes that decision at the diagnostic interview at the beginning of someone’s 
claim. They will assess the customer as either being red, which means realistically they need 
far more help than we would have time to give them. Amber, i.e. those are the people we need 
to target because with a bit of help they’ll go back to work. Or green, they don’t need any help 
at all. Those people also need to be monitored,…the green people go off or do they need to 
be moved into amber…Apart from that, Advisers choose to see who they choose they see, we 
need…not seeing just green people who will help themselves to go back to work, so they’ve got 
fantastic figures…’ 
(Operational manager: Jobcentre Directorate)
However, there was some discussion among a small number of respondents that suggested that 
there may now be a tendency not to focus on those customers that need help the most and instead 
focus on achievable off-flows. As such it was not clear to what extent the PMF, flexibilities and the 
focus on off-flows specifically were leading to the inappropriate prioritisation of jobseekers.
To some extent, the introduction of the PMF, and the labour market context brings the definition of 
what counts as appropriate and inappropriate prioritisation into question. There is protection against 
the inappropriate prioritisation of jobseekers for intervention by the apparently increased scrutiny of 
caseloads and qualitative assessments of Adviser interviews by ATMs. This suggests that Advisers 
have to account for their prioritisation decisions, especially in the context of the use of cohort 
lists. The issue of the appropriateness of prioritising jobseekers for treatment remains important 
and the effect this has on customer service in Jobcentres will be further explored by the ongoing 
evaluation of the Jobcentre Plus Offer. This issue should also be a large part of any future research 
on performance management in Jobcentre Plus.
The issue of inappropriate sanctions was raised in the media over the last year when it was reported 
that Jobcentre Plus had a ‘target’ for sanctioning customers (Domokos 2011). Technically this 
was never a target and was instead an ‘expected level of performance’ on one of the benchmark 
indicators in the scorecards and has now been removed. In practice though these sorts of semantic 
differences are not fully appreciated by operational staff. Adviser respondents who spoke about this 
issue suggested that they had previously viewed this expected level of performance as a ‘target’ 
that they were to achieve, but didn’t report that they had ever inappropriately referred a customer 
for sanction in order simply to meet it. They also suggested that they now retained a focus on 
testing conditionality and described the circumstances in which they would refer a customer for a 
potential sanction. None of these sounded inappropriate based on the evidence gathered as part of 
this evaluation. Indeed, inference drawn from these discussions with Advisers suggested that some 
are reluctant to refer customers for potential sanction on the grounds of sympathy with customers 
as well as a lack of knowledge and confidence in how to process such a referral. This is corroborated 
by data on sanctions which shows that referrals for sanction and disallowances rose from 2009 but 
then fell dramatically during 2011 (Office for National Statistics 2012). Again though, as with the 
issue of appropriate prioritisation of jobseekers for interventions, this is a difficult issue to assess 
rigorously at this point using the method employed, but remains an important area for any future 
research on performance management in Jobcentre Plus.
Given the current absence of off-flow rate into employment data and the widespread focus in 
Jobcentres on off-flows only, shifting between benefits is one potential perverse incentive presented 
by the PMF. However, this is mitigated by changes in the benefit system which make it difficult to 
transfer to inactive benefits. Moreover, discussions with Advisers suggested that the only conditions 
in which they would consider recommending that customers transfer between benefits is where this 
fitted the eligibility requirements for the relevant benefit. 
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5.2.3 Problems and perverse incentives in Contact Centres
The perverse incentives that can arise in Contact Centres relate to the way that productivity 
measures intersect with the quality of the process undertaken. For example, monitoring and 
targeting of call times can lead to circumstances where either calls are inappropriately terminated 
or the data gathered is incomplete or of poor quality. This is a false efficiency because it generates 
repeat contact with the organisation, thereby occupying more resources and resulting in customer 
dissatisfaction. Equally, placing no restrictions on calls time might result in increased likelihood of 
CSAs giving inappropriate advice or guidance to customers.
Discussions with CSAs and team leaders revealed no evidence that they were feeling under pressure 
to cut call times artificially by prematurely ending complex calls, though there was widespread 
acknowledgement that this may have been the case in the past. It was not clear however that 
the change in the nature of the scorecard to incentivise ‘expected levels’ only and not to reward 
exceeding them was responsible for this. Some respondents, mainly site managers, thought that 
the changing scorecards were responsible, but many CSAs seemed not to be fully aware of the 
scorecards, suggesting that this is not the case. This might be explained by line managers putting 
less pressure on CSAs to reduce their AHT and correspondingly putting more emphasis on qualitative 
measures of call handling. Several participants also suggested that ‘hand offs’ to Benefit Centres 
were being monitored closely by managers, perhaps as a means of promoting performance against 
the ‘call resolution’ measure on the scorecard.
5.2.4 Problems and perverse incentives in Benefit Centres
In Benefit Centres there are several possible ways in which performance management could 
present perverse incentives. The first relates to cherry picking either easy, and therefore quick, cases 
or to shelving cases that are either difficult and thus time consuming, or have already exceeded 
particular milestones in the performance regime. Previously, Jobcentre Plus operated an Average 
Actual Clearance Time (AACT) target of specific time periods for different benefits. This presented an 
incentive not to process claims that had already exceeded that target when performance against 
the target was tight. This has now been replaced with a series of time bands against which cleared 
benefit claims are reported, with the intention of removing this perverse incentive. Additionally, 
where workflow management systems operate virtually so that unprocessed work is ‘exported’ 
to another site, this creates a potential problem where ‘easy’ work is cherry picked for immediate 
processing whereas more difficult work could be selected for ‘export’ with the adverse effects on 
motivation experienced by the site importing the work. In a similar vein, there is also scope, where 
productivity benchmarks are relatively easy to reach, to ensure that additional work is not imported. 
Finally, where different benefit claims use different processes but the eligibility criteria are close, it 
may be that more onerous processes are avoided, leading to incorrect payments.
There was no evidence in any of the sites of older claims not being cleared because they had 
already missed a milestone target such as the old AACT target. Many participants in Benefit Centres 
did acknowledge that prioritisation processes had previously worked in this way but were no 
longer present, suggesting that the new time band approach is being successful. There was some 
suggestion that there may be gaming of the workflow management (AOM) system in place in some 
offices. For example, some respondents suggested that there was no incentive to clear work quickly 
when that would result in higher workflows in the next time period (e.g. week/month), some of 
which might be imported work from elsewhere in the country. This then may create pressures to 
artificially slow the workflow down to avoid importing work from elsewhere. 
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‘…it’s	a	vicious	circle	really,	because	if	you	get	up	to	date	then	you	have	to	import	work.	Which	
means	you	leave	your	own	work	to	get	behind.	So	there’s	fewer	people	doing	the	work	from	this	
office,	which	means	that	emails	build	up…which	where,	that’s	where	the	pressure	comes	on	
because	you’ve	got	time	limits	on	there.	And	then	once	you	start	having	the	emails,	you’re	doing	
less	processing…which	means	you	get	more	emails…so	you	get	behind,	then	start	exporting	
work	to	someone	else…[in response to this]…they’ll	arrange	training,	an	hour	when	everyone	
goes	off	for	a	training	session…just	to	get	rid	of	some	of	the	excess	hours	that	we’ve	got…it’s	just	
created	just	so	that	we	don’t	have	to	import	so	much	work	[in the first place]…’
(Frontline operational staff: Benefit Centre Directorate)
Respondents in one office complained that the imported work was of a more complex nature than 
the average, suggesting that some process of cherry-picking might have taken place. This is despite 
protocols that explicitly try to prevent this.
5.3 Summary
The research findings suggest that the PMF (in combination with other initiatives) is associated with 
neutral or positive developments in terms of motivation and behaviour in each of the Directorates. 
However, there is considerable variation within and between sites and geographical locations, and 
care should be exercised when seeking to generalise the research findings:
• In Jobcentres the increase in flexibility appeared to be empowering and motivating for Advisers, 
though there were some small concerns about the lack of connection between the outcome 
measures and the role, for example, of Assistant Advisers. 
• In Contact Centres staff were pleased by the slight rebalancing of the managerial emphasis away 
from the AHT.
• In Benefit Centres staff were being driven in the main by workflow management systems rather 
than PMF and some found this de-motivating either because it meant that good performance 
was understood to be rewarded by additional workflow or because it incentivised staff to be less 
efficient.
• There is some contested evidence that perverse incentives may operate under the PMF for 
Advisers in Jobcentres in relation to customer prioritisation in particular. However, it was not 
possible to reach definitive conclusions on this and much depends on the definition of what is and 
is not appropriate. 
• On the other hand, there was clear and considerable evidence that the PMF and the removal of 
the IDT has led to a significant reduction in perverse incentives to misdirect Adviser and other 
resource to generate unnecessary interventions.
• In Contact Centres, though it was not widely discussed by respondents in an explicit sense, 
there was some reason to conclude that there may have been a reduction in some important 
perverse incentives. For example, the motivation to reduce call time through inappropriate call 
terminations appeared to be both reduced and countered by the range of alternative performance 
management practices and indicators used.
• In Benefit Centres, the shift toward time bands rather than a single milestone in the operation  
of the AACT appeared to have removed any incentive that might have previously operated to  
de-prioritise long-running outstanding claims. 
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6 Governance and transparency
6.1 Organisational structures 
6.1.1 Development process 
The work to develop and implement the new Performance Management Framework (PMF) was carried 
out through a joint project, staffed by Welfare to Work Stewardship Division in the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) and Strategic Planning and Assurance Division (SPAD)4 in Jobcentre Plus. 
Also closely involved were a range of other key representatives from DWP Planning and Performance 
Management and Operational Performance Planning and Change (formerly Operational Delivery 
Support). Following the announcement of the Corporate Centre Review (February 2011), it was agreed 
that implementation should go ahead on an interim basis, with the development of governance and 
accountability roles taking place at a later date (PMF Project Team 2011). As the PMF moved towards 
implementation, a weekly Issues Group was established to ensure that any outstanding items of work, 
issues and risks were actively managed in order to ensure successful implementation. The End of 
Project Report identified a number of key lessons emerging from the development process (see Box 3). 
Box 3 Key learning points
What went well 
• Maintained a strong focus on the primary 
objective despite a range of sometimes 
competing interests. The clarity of objective 
aided the decision to implement on 
an interim basis, pending resolution of 
governance and accountability issues,  
once the review of the Corporate Centre  
was announced. 
• Excellent engagement and sign up of 
appropriate stakeholders was aided by 
having clearly defined principles, desired 
outcomes and by being flexible about 
engagement methods. 
• Struck an appropriate balance between 
collaborative working and maintaining 
the need for distinct roles. Joint DWP 
and Jobcentre Plus Project leads worked 
well together putting the needs of the 
organisation and the customer above 
any internal differences, but retained 
the important Agency/DWP relationship, 
allowing challenge or debate to take place 
when necessary. 
What could have gone better
• The project would have benefited from earlier, 
direct access to the Jobcentre Plus Chief 
Operating Officer and Executive, enabling a 
better understanding of how the framework 
could be implemented and how it would look 
and feel on the front line. 
• The original project governance arrangements 
proved to be a little clunky at times and had to 
be reviewed midway through the project. Whilst 
meetings with Director Generals and Chief 
Executives provided helpful steers, they took 
much of the authority away from the formal 
project governance via the Performance and 
Target Strategy Group. 
• For a number of reasons, including a temporary 
embargo, formal communications with 
operational staff started only a couple of 
months before implementation. Road -shows 
and a video were developed, delivered and well 
received by operational staff, and the project 
would have liked to have made more use of 
innovative means of communication, but due to 
financial constraints, this was not possible. 
4 SPAD was previously known as the Performance Measurement and Analysis Division which 
undertook most of the analytical work to develop the PMF.
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6.1.2 Implementation
Following implementation in April 2011, a PMF Change Control Board (CCB) was set up to 
maintain the integrity and principles of the framework and to ensure that any potential additions, 
amendments or removal of measures from the framework were appropriate and consistent with 
the principles underpinning PMF. Around the same time, a new performance regime was introduced 
in DWP, based on a Performance Agreement between the Department and Jobcentre Plus. Several 
respondents reported that the principles underpinning the PMF informed the development of this 
Agreement which includes the two key outcome measures.
The PMF is subject to continuous improvement in order to fine tune or add data once it becomes 
available. The PMF is actively managed by the CCB (which ran alongside the Issues Group for a short 
period in Autumn 2011). Any changes to the PMF proposed by this group are reviewed and taken 
forward through a Performance Framework Steering Group which is convened as necessary. 
In general the respondents contributing to the research provide mixed views associated with the 
governance and transparency of the PMF. Many of those at Group level and below were unsure of 
the governance arrangements associated with PMF and had little to say. 
6.1.3 Respondent views of the governance structures
Several of those involved in developing the PMF reported effective governance structures up 
to implementation, citing robust conversations associated with the design, development and 
implementation of the PMF. Nevertheless, a small number of these respondents reported that the 
development of the PMF may have benefited from a greater involvement of the highest level of 
operations at an earlier stage in the process. Many of the conversations appeared to centre on the 
tension between an emphasis on scorecards in the operational environment and the nature and 
extent of cultural change desired through the implementation of the PMF.
Following implementation (at the time of the fieldwork in October–November 2011), the existing 
governance arrangements for the PMF were unclear for the majority of respondents. Many of 
those expressing their views drew attention to the various internal reorganisations associated with 
performance management and strategy that have taken place during the lifetime of the PMF. This 
had resulted in some uncertainty surrounding the governance of the PMF. 
Some respondents noted that, while the PMF currently resides in Finance, custodianship or 
guardianship is a shared responsibility which requires collective attention. A couple of National 
managers noted the need to consider how the governance of performance management works 
within the context of the new organisational design within DWP. These respondents identified the 
need to develop greater understanding of how it all comes together at the Departmental level. 
Several respondents suggest that the PMF, often in association with other measures, had supported 
increased transparency through, for example, information sharing across Directorate boundaries 
and greater team-working. The development of the ‘Customer Journey’ scorecard at Group level is 
identified as a positive development associated with the PMF. 
6.2 External transparency and accountability
The Government is committed to increasing transparency so that the public can more easily see 
how and where taxpayers’ money is being spent and hold politicians, government departments and 
public bodies to account. The DWP Business Plan for 2011-2015 contains impact indicators which 
are designed to help the public to judge whether policies and reforms are having their anticipated 
effect. Two of these indicators are the framework outcomes: (i) the rate of people moving off out of 
work benefits into employment and (ii) reducing the Monetary Value of Fraud and Error (MVFE). 
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The PMF is designed to support the transparency agenda by ensuring that high-level data can 
be made available to third parties in an open and standardised format to fulfil the need for 
accountability. Research participants generally supported5 the publication of this data on the 
DWP and Number 10 websites. However, many respondents drew attention to the reality that 
the publication of the information provides ‘only part of the story’ and that the data will need 
further contextualisation in order to understand the performance of Jobcentre Plus. One fieldwork 
participant highlighted the potential for public/private sector comparisons between Jobcentre Plus 
and Work Programme providers which may present a new challenge for those seeking to understand 
and assess performance. 
The majority of respondents suggested that it is too early to fully assess the impact of the PMF on 
external transparency and accountability. One of the reasons for this is that the timelag on the 
impact indicator meant that data on moving people into employment was not available at the 
time of the fieldwork6 and the vast majority of staff respondents were unaware of the more timely 
outcome data that is available. However, performance on the MVFE measure is published on a 
monthly basis. The consensus among respondents expressing a view through the research appears 
to be that, at the current time, the impact of the PMF on transparency is broadly neutral.
The Department and Jobcentre Plus have a range of external partners and stakeholders who have 
an interest in their performance and operations. These include employers, welfare to work providers, 
voluntary and community sector organisations, the media and the public as well as the range of public 
bodies engaged in economic development. The vast majority of respondents suggested that the PMF 
has had little or no impact on relationships with these external stakeholders. There are, however, 
one or two examples identified in the research that suggest that the PMF has changed the emphasis 
of some conversations away from the detail of performance towards general trends and issues. 
The PMF appears to have had little or no impact on the approach adopted to engage employers. 
For many respondents this was not identified as a ‘problem’. However, for a small minority the 
limited visibility of employers in the PMF is reported as a weakness given that they play a key role 
in providing the jobs which contribute to the achievement of the key outcome measure associated 
with moving people into work. 
6.3 Summary 
• PMF Project Team respondents reported strong governance in the project to design the PMF.
• Following implementation (at the time of the fieldwork in October–November 2011), the 
governance arrangements for the PMF were unclear for the majority of respondents, though this 
was likely to be partly the result of the reorganisation of DWP which was being implemented at 
the time of the fieldwork.
• In the case of transparency, many respondents drew attention to the need to contextualise the 
headline outcomes in order to understand the performance of Jobcentre Plus and also suggested 
that it was too soon to assess the PMF’s impact on transparency. Although the data on the fraud 
and error outcome measure are published monthly, outcome data on the rate of off-flow into 
employment was not available at the time of fieldwork.
• The majority of respondents suggested that, at this time, the PMF has made little difference to 
the relationship between Jobcentre Plus and various external stakeholders such as employers, 
providers or the voluntary and community sector.
5 Support ‘in principle’ as the data was not published at the time of the fieldwork. 
6 A survey of benefit destinations was completed in late 2011 and published in February 2012 
(Adams et	al. 2012).
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7 Cross-cutting themes 
A key challenge in the current environment is to deliver excellent customer service while reducing 
costs and increasing value for money for the taxpayer. This is embodied in the PMF through the  
cross-cutting themes associated with value for money and productivity and customer experience 
and included in the scorecards which emphasise more efficient, cost-effective delivery and  
customer service. 
7.1 Value for money and productivity 
At site, District, Group and National levels, and across the different directorates, there was a 
widespread acknowledgement of the links between being more outcome focused, avoiding 
unnecessary customer contact and the need to enhance value for money and productivity. The 
research identified a small number of examples, some of which had broad and substantial impact, 
where respondents were able to clearly identify the precise connections between the PMF and 
value for money. Outside of these, most respondents were able only to make assumptions about 
this relationship and, in a small number of cases, particularly among some PMF Project Team and 
National manager respondents, there was considerable reflection on the lack of connection between 
the PMF and a substantive understanding of the costs and benefits of different delivery patterns. It 
was noted for example that simple measures of productivity during a recession, where notionally 
there is more demand on Adviser resources, might show increasing resource inputs resulting in 
fewer off-flows or even a declining off-flow rate, thereby implying reduced productivity (e.g. in a cost 
per off-flow rate measure) without fully accounting for the context in which this was occurring. This 
is accounted for in some Public Employment Services (PES) performance management frameworks 
by the inclusion of ‘contextual indicators’.7
The main example of where respondents were clearly able to articulate a link between the PMF 
and value for money was in the reduction of unnecessary activities driven by previous performance 
targets. The removal of the Interventions Delivery Target (IDT) was the clearest illustration of the 
link between the PMF and value for money because this did not just occupy large numbers of 
Advisers delivering interviews to ensure compliance with the process requirement to see jobseekers 
at particular milestones; it also meant that large numbers of staff were devoted to managing the 
diaries of Advisers to ensure that the target was met. This resulted in multiple and, according to 
respondents, often unnecessary contacts with customers; arranging, undertaking and chasing 
appointments. Several respondents suggested that the savings and, therefore, also real productivity 
enhancements associated with removing this workload, are substantial. 
‘…previously,	I	did	a	whole	load	of	interviews	in	different	job	centres…I	talked	about	perverse	
behaviour,	they	were	for	a	particular	target	[IDT].	So	I	would	bring	a	customer	in,	even	though	I	
knew	that,	that	interview	wouldn’t	have	value	to	the	off-flow.	I	didn’t	have	to	do	that	anymore,	
I	can	locally	decide	I’m	going	to	drop	that	type	of	interview,	I’m	not	going	to	run	that	type	of	
group	session,	I’m	going	to	do	this	instead.	Which	then	enables	me	to	target	the	resources	so	
that	I	get	a	better	value	for	money.’
(Frontline operational staff: Jobcentre Directorate)
7 See for example the PES Benchmarking Project: 
http://www.pes-benchmarking.eu/english/about.asp?IdPageLv=1
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The second example where there was a direct and persuasive acknowledgement of the link between 
the PMF and value for money was in relation to the re-balancing of the managerial emphasis in 
Contact Centres between Average Handling Time (AHT) and quality checks and, in Jobcentres, the 
greater use of Quality Error Reduction Checks. These were identified as one potential means of 
influencing Monetary Value of Fraud and Error (MVFE), by improving the quality of data collection in 
the case of Contact Centres and, in the case of Jobcentres, improving the awareness of Advisers about 
how to ensure that customers meet conditionality requirements. This was perhaps the strongest 
conceptual link between operational behaviour and the MVFE target. On this, and in general, it was 
difficult for respondents to make a clear link between changes in their operational behaviour and 
performance on the MVFE, beyond the simple assertion that if fewer errors were made, fraud and 
error would reduce and value for money would also be enhanced by a reduction in repeat contact. 
Across all Directorates, the link between performance management and productivity/value for 
money concerns was stronger in relation to the scorecards than it was for the narrower definition 
of the PMF. The Benefit Centre scorecard for example includes multiple measures of productivity 
and workflow. However, the productivity measures were controversial with some respondents 
suggesting that these were detrimental for quality and error reduction. That said, the pressures 
that respondents spoke about in relation to productivity were attributed to the Active Operations 
Management workflow management system rather than the scorecards. One respondent in a 
Benefit Centre operating AOM for a period of time suggested that there may be tensions between 
the two performance management systems. 
Similar concerns were raised in Contact Centres. Many Customer Service Agents (CSAs) and team 
leaders suggested that there was a tension between the productivity-influenced indicators by which 
they are measured (principally AHT) and value for money in the sense of accurate data capture 
on the first call. Respondents in one site indicated that this was perhaps less of a concern than in 
the past since AHT time had increased slightly, though respondents suggested that there may be 
marginally different expectations of AHT in different Contact Centres. In addition, some managers 
suggested that increased call times might actually open up the possibility for greater deviation from 
the script and therefore incorrect information provision. 
Other areas mentioned by respondents in relation to value for money and productivity but not 
directly relevant to the PMF included the reorganisation of performance reporting into Operational 
Performance, Planning and Change. The second reorganisation was underway at the time of the 
fieldwork and so little definitive evidence was gained on this question. However, some efficiency 
gains were noted from having a centralised performance reporting function. This was felt by some 
to reduce duplication of effort in formal8 performance reporting and also to facilitate shared learning 
from performance information such that best practice could more easily be shared across Districts, 
with potential improvements in performance, and therefore efficiency. However, this appeared 
to be an assumed benefit rather than one that was clearly demonstrable by evidence. Given the 
time taken to embed new systems, ways of working and for shared learning to emerge this is not 
unexpected but it will be an important area to investigate in any future research on performance 
management in Jobcentre Plus.
7.2 Customer experience 
The Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus have a tradition of seeking to develop 
and improve customer experience and the PMF is designed to encourage appropriate behaviours in 
this respect. Many of the respondents highlighted the importance of customer service and ‘doing the 
8 To be distinguished from informal duplication of effort through localised data collection by 
individual Advisers.
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right thing for the customer’. Examples cited by respondents included greater understanding of the 
quality of the customer journey leading to an emphasis on ‘first contact call resolution’ in Contact 
Centres, the development of Adviser flexibility in Jobcentres and improved scheduling of claims by 
Benefit Centres. 
Respondents expressed a range of views associated with the impact of the PMF on customer 
experience, ranging from those who reported no adverse impact to those who reported that PMF 
had positively supported the improvement of the customer experience. However, given a range of 
organisational changes and initiatives, participants often found it difficult to disentangle cause and 
effect associated with the PMF. 
Many respondents reported that Jobcentre Plus already had a strong commitment to improving 
the customer experience. Several of the PMF Project Team and National managers anticipated that 
the PMF has made a further difference but also expressed concern that it has not yet had sufficient 
impact on behaviours. For example, one respondent noted:
‘We	are	still	chasing	targets	–	I	was	speaking	to	someone	doing	appeals	in	a	Benefit	Centre	and	I	
asked	how	many	are	you	hoping	to	do	hoping	she	would	say	‘just	as	many	as	I	can’	and	she	said	
we	have	on	average	about	12	a	day	and	I	said	how	does	it	feel	and	she	said	it’s	alright,	you	get	
some	easy	and	some	more	difficult	but	I	got	the	sense	that	when	she’s	done	12	that’s	it	–		
I	didn’t	get	the	feeling	that	she	was	dealing	with	a	person,	just	a	case.’	
(PMF Project Team)
Other senior managers were more confident that, in combination with other initiatives (such 
as increased flexibilities), the PMF was driving behaviours towards a more customer-oriented, 
personalised service. This was apparent across the three Directorates. For example, in Jobcentres  
this was focused on increased Adviser flexibility, in Benefit Centres several respondents identified  
the move to use ‘time bands’ in relation to claims clearance rather than the Average Actual 
Clearance Time (AACT) as helping to improve customer service and ensure that customers ‘do not 
slip through the cracks’ in the system. In Contact Centres it was focused on increased attention on 
the quality of data collection. 
Jobcentre Advisers generally welcomed recent developments as making a positive contribution 
to the customer experience. Advisers reported being afforded greater flexibility and an emphasis 
on doing as much as possible for the customer early in the intervention (which had not been the 
case previously). Disentangling the influence of the PMF from the increased flexibilities under the 
Jobcentre Plus Offer is difficult. It is clear however, that the PMF is likely to have supported the 
implementation of a flexible, personalised approach in Jobcentres. Several respondents drew 
attention to the different performance conversations PMF is intended to encourage. For example:
‘The	conversation	is	very	much	about	the	outcome	and	not	you’ve	done	x	interviews	this	week	
and	made	x	referrals.’	
(Group-level manager: Jobcentre Directorate)
	
‘Observations	have	been	replaced	by	case	conferences,	they	are	asking	staff	what	they	think	of	
the	customer	and	what	they	plan	to	do	next.’
(Operational manager: Jobcentre Directorate)
One of the changes that appears to have benefited customer service is the change in the approach 
to appointment booking for Advisers. This can have a direct impact on the headline performance 
measures as illustrated by the following observation from an Adviser:
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‘Your diary used to get booked up from 9:30–4:30 and if there were jobs available and you knew 
someone who was suitable you couldn’t find the time to arrange to see them.’
(Frontline operational staff: Jobcentre Directorate)
At the local level, frontline operational respondents provided a mixed view of behaviours associated 
with the customer experience. In one Contact Centre the view from CSAs and team leaders was that 
behaviour is now more about customer experience and getting the right information first time from 
calls. In another area, the CSAs suggested that there has always been an emphasis on customer 
service and that there is still an emphasis on ‘numbers’.
One of the challenges for the organisation is how to reconcile the different and sometimes 
competing objectives associated with customer experience and productivity or value for money. 
Many of the respondents reported that there was ‘some way to go’ before the organisation 
understood and communicated what productivity and value for money actually means. 
7.3 Customer groups 
Participants were asked how the new way of measuring performance has affected those groups 
most at risk of exclusion from the labour market. Disentangling the role of the PMF from general and 
wider welfare and benefit reforms, for example, migration from Incapacity Benefit to Employment 
and Support Allowance, and movement of lone parents from Income Support to Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, adds to the complexity of the analysis.
The general view appears to be that PMF has had no substantial impact on disadvantaged groups 
in Contact and Benefit Centre Directorates. In Contact Centres ‘relaxing’ of the AHT was reported 
by some to provide Contact Centre CSAs with greater time to deal with more complex problems 
which results in improved customer service and more effective call handling. In Benefit Centres the 
changes to the AACT measure are likely to have benefited customers with more complex benefit 
claims. In Jobcentres the issue is more complex. The discussion in Section 5.2 suggests that it is not 
clear whether disadvantaged customers have been effected positively or negatively by the PMF.
7.4 Summary 
• The PMF had supported improved collaboration between Directorates through, for example, the 
development of the ‘customer journey’ at Group Delivery Network level.
• Participants were able to identify cost savings and improved flexibility associated with, for 
example, the removal of IDT and the improvement of the quality of call resolution and data 
collection.
• Simple measures of productivity in an adverse economic climate, where there is more demand for 
employment services and fewer job vacancies, could be subject to misinterpretation, and ongoing 
work is seeking to address this. 
• The PMF has had an uncertain effect on harder-to-help customer groups. Though some 
respondents thought the impact was neutral, mixed customer prioritisation practices mean that 
this is something which must continue to be monitored. The effect of these changes may take 
longer to become clear and it is important that the longer-term effect of these changes are 
explored as part of the evaluation of the Jobcentre Plus Offer.
• The shift away from the AACT to measuring clearance times on time bands is likely to have 
benefited disadvantaged customers with complex benefit claims.
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8 Conclusions and implications
8.1 Research questions
The following section summarises the conclusions from the research under the key research 
questions set for the evaluation at the outset.
8.1.1 Is the performance of Jobcentre Plus being measured in the right ways?
The evidence from staff interviews and the review of documentation strongly supports the idea that 
the two outcome measures in the Performance Management Framework (PMF) capture the overall 
purpose of Jobcentre Plus as being to help unemployed customers to move into work as quickly as 
possible and in the intervening period to effectively process and administer their claims for benefit to 
reduce the cost of fraud and error. There is also some evidence that Operational managers at District 
and Site level in Jobcentre Directorate are experiencing some difficulty in gaining access to or using 
weekly off-flow performance information that is available to them. The perceived delay in receiving 
this information creates problems for Operational managers and is leading to duplication in data 
production. Ironically, this may have been positive in securing greater ownership (partly through 
the local production of off-flow data, of some of the changes envisaged by the PMF). However, over 
the coming months it will be important to ensure that the relevant staff understand and trust the 
information available to them. This will be further improved as the ‘into employment’ element of the 
data becomes available. This will be important in helping to emphasise the ‘right type’ of off-flows 
and to ensure that perverse incentives are further minimised.
The supporting data/measures in the PMF are also regarded as comprehensive in relation to the 
needs of managers and staff throughout the organisation. However, there remains some tension 
around the use of scorecards. The PMF Project Team had hoped to move away from the use of 
scorecards and there is some evidence that these are being used to compare the performance 
of Districts and sites and to generate individual-level targets in ways that are in tension with 
the philosophy underpinning the PMF. Operational staff from national- to frontline-levels are 
less concerned with this philosophical tension and are more comfortable with the scorecards. 
This might have been expected given the different levels of accountability and perspective in 
the organisation and the degree of prior commitment to targets and quantitative performance 
information in Jobcentre Plus organisational culture. While all respondents, no matter how critical 
of the scorecards, acknowledged that they are an improvement on previous versions, there may 
be scope for further cultural change to make less or at least better use of scorecards. One way of 
driving this cultural change might be to undertake regular reviews of the scorecards to test their 
utility for different roles and levels in the organisational hierarchy. This evaluation suggests that 
their utility rests with site-level Operational managers and above for the purposes of identifying and 
understanding performance variation. 
This evaluation also suggested that the PMF has had some but comparatively little impact in Contact 
Centres and Benefit Centres. The main impact in Contact Centres appears to be on marginally 
shifting management practice toward more qualitative measures. In Benefit Centres the main 
impact appears to have resulted from the change in the way that Average Actual Clearance Time is 
measured in the use of time bands, which, while positive, has been overshadowed by other changes 
to workflow management.
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8.1.2 What do staff understand about the PMF?
Awareness and understanding of the PMF in its entirety and the full underpinning philosophy is 
limited, especially at site level. Nevertheless, all respondents appeared to understand the ways in 
which the PMF had impacted on their own performance management, and for the most part, staff 
understood any changed management and performance messages that result from the PMF. In 
particular there was widespread acknowledgement among Advisers that their role had shifted from 
delivering specified interventions to focusing on helping customers into employment in a more 
flexible way. In this sense the PMF is in line with wider changes in the Jobcentre Plus Offer to provide 
Advisers with more autonomy. The nature of the connection between all three Directorates and the 
Monetary Value of Fraud and Error (MVFE) measure is less direct and, in addition, there has been no 
change to the MVFE measure. As such it is less clear that there is any substantial change in practice 
in relation to this. Nevertheless, respondents in Contact and Benefit Centres did understand that 
there was a renewed management emphasis on avoiding error and fraud.
8.1.3 Does the PMF provide adequate support within the increasingly flexible 
environment?
The nature of the Jobcentre Plus Offer is to extend flexibility within Jobcentre Directorate, and 
specifically the role of Adviser. There was a strong acknowledgement in all three sample Districts that 
the role of Adviser was changing and that this was toward greater autonomy to manage a caseload 
of customers in a more flexible manner. The PMF was clearly thought to support this, particularly 
through the removal of the Interventions Delivery Target (IDT) and the new emphasis on off-flows to 
employment. However, this also meant that it was difficult to attribute the changes that had taken 
place purely to the introduction of the PMF. It was also clear that the change to greater flexibility 
was (a) still underway, (b) had proven both exciting and rewarding for Advisers at the same time as 
being challenging, (c) that the previous emphasis on process controls meant that this transition was 
initially regarded with some suspicion, and (d) that it had resulted in a variety of practice.
In some cases, greater autonomy had been more effectively transferred to the Adviser level, 
whereas in others it had moved mainly to site or Adviser team manager (ATM) level. As such, there 
was more evidence of an emphasis on outcome-oriented performance management with individual 
Advisers, and sometimes the direct translation of scorecard ‘expected levels of performance’ to 
individual targets for Adviser performance on off-flow rates. In the latter case there was more 
evidence of ATMs articulating expected levels of activity to Advisers whether that be in the form of 
time spent with customers or particular outputs such as referrals to provision, submissions to jobs 
or conditionality testing activities. The way in which this divergent practice develops should be an 
important theme for exploration in the ongoing evaluation of the Jobcentre Plus Offer, and any 
future research on performance management in Jobcentre Plus.
Despite this variation in practice, in all Districts there was an emphasis on the use of cohort lists of 
customers approaching particular milestones in their benefit claims (as in the scorecards) to focus 
discussions about performance at the individual Adviser level and this was matched by a caseload 
management approach to prioritising customers for intervention. This was in line with increasing 
Adviser flexibility and there appeared to be scope for some autonomy in meeting diverse customer 
needs. However, there was also evidence of divergent practice in customer prioritisation and further 
investigation of the evolution of this practice should also be a theme in the ongoing evaluation of 
the Jobcentre Plus Offer, and any future research on performance management in Jobcentre Plus.
The data collected on how Advisers use flexibility was in the main encouraging and in line with policy 
intentions. However, previous experience suggests that disruption to performance management in 
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Jobcentre Plus may lead to more emphasis on flexibility and qualitative mechanisms of performance 
management. Evidence collected in the evaluation of the Job Outcome Target (JOT) pilots and the 
early phases of roll-out suggested that caseload conferencing, sharing of good practice and greater 
willingness to use a variety of interventions and support to meet individual needs also resulted from 
that change in performance management. Any future research in this area should explore how 
management messages and behavioural incentives are shaped in the longer term. 
8.1.4	 Are	staff	and	managers	more	focused	and	accountable	for	the	right	
outcomes	for	customers?	
There is considerable evidence in Jobcentre Directorate that the PMF focus on off-flows is translating 
into a greater operational focus on helping customers make the transition from benefits to work. 
There is also clearly accountability throughout the organisational hierarchy in relation to this 
measure, with it being seen as central by National managers and frontline operational staff . There 
was also evidence of the removal of perverse incentives previously generated through the IDT to 
generate unnecessary and often ineffective interventions.
However, while there was little direct evidence of new perverse incentives introduced by the PMF, 
there was some scope to suspect that these may exist, or may evolve in the future.
In Contact Centres there was some evidence that the introduction of more qualitative checks and 
changes to the Average Handling Time (AHT) and mandatory script may have marginally reduced 
perverse incentives, such as to ‘drop’ calls or to miss information in the data gathering process. In 
Benefit Centres the effect of the PMF was also broadly positive in virtually removing any incentive to 
deprioritise older outstanding claims.
8.1.5	 Is	there	enough	incentive	to	work	with	harder-to-help	groups?
This issue is complex. Increasing Adviser flexibility on the one hand creates more autonomy for 
Advisers to focus on individual needs rather than to tailor their approach to pre-determined ‘groups’ 
of customers. In this sense the very term ‘harder-to-help’ customer groups has less currency and 
purchase now than it would have had when this clearly linked to specific groups of customers in the 
performance management regime, as was the case with JOT. Given the challenging labour market 
context, that might suggest that Advisers would be more willing now to work with customers for 
whom a more immediate labour market outcome is more likely. On the other hand, increasing 
flexibility also provides Advisers with the scope to focus more on those customers who might benefit 
from an intervention, and to leave those capable to help themselves. The evidence collected from 
Advisers and Operational managers at ATM, site and District level suggested that no clear pattern has 
set in in relation to customer prioritisation. The messages given to Advisers about appropriate criteria 
for customer prioritisation are also much more complex than in the past and, as above, further 
exploration of this should be a key theme in the ongoing evaluation of the Jobcentre Plus Offer.
There appeared to be no change in the incentives for staff in the Contact Centre and Benefit Centre 
Directorates to work with different customer groups. Unless a customer presents as obviously 
requiring assistance because they are unable to complete the new claims interview or require 
Language Line assistance, there is little that Contact Centre staff can do to meet differing customer 
needs. That said, changes to the AHT expectation, modifications to the script and the increased 
emphasis on call quality to balance times, may mean that Customer Service Agents are able to 
be more patient with customers that require a little more time. In Benefit Centres processing staff 
reported no real change in the way that they interact with different customers.
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8.1.6 How are the governance routes working under the new PMF?
The governance of the PMF is complex and the considerable change underway in the organisation 
immediately prior and also during the fieldwork phase make this difficult to judge conclusively. 
Of particular interest are changes to the organisation of performance reporting and support for 
performance improvement. There is considerable scope to suggest that the centralisation of these 
functions may have benefits in greater efficiency in performance reporting and more effective 
sharing of good practice in supporting performance improvement. However, it was not possible to 
identify specific examples of these benefits in practice at the time of the fieldwork. It is therefore 
important that any future research explores this issue in more depth
8.1.7 Is there a clear line of sight between activities, productivity  
and outcomes?
For the most part there is a clear line of sight between different levels in the organisation and this 
is facilitated by the PMF and associated tools, especially the Group Delivery Network or ‘customer 
journey’ scorecard. Indeed, the introduction of this scorecard, which met with widespread 
operational approval, might serve as a mechanism for reform and reduction of the other 
Directorate-level scorecards. However, there may be greater scope for the utilisation of shared 
arrangements for performance management in the following respects:
• at Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)-level in relation to the Performance Agreement and 
Business Planning process;
• in relation to the merging of Jobcentre Plus and the Pensions, Disability and Carers Service (PDCS);
• in relation to the Work Programme.
Tying these functional areas and organisational levels together may entail further development of 
the PMF, but this was always the intention. A single DWP PMF would assist in further developing the 
‘clear line of sight’, promoting greater transparency, accountability and simplicity in performance 
reporting. It should be noted however that continuous review and challenge not just to performance 
but to the PMF itself is essential in ensuring that performance reporting and management remain 
proportional and cost effective. Too much performance information can be distracting, unnecessarily 
bureaucratic and costly.
8.2 Implications for the development of the PMF
This research suggests that the PMF is ‘a work in progress’ and that there is a need to continue to 
support cultural change.9 Key areas to consider are:
• In implementing future processes for performance management there needs to be a consistency of 
message designed to address the specific changes required of different job roles in the organisation. 
These need to be planned and available in time to support the roll-out of major initiatives.
9 At the time of writing, detailed planning of performance management processes for 2012/13 
within Jobcentre Plus and wider DWP Operations are currently underway. A series of 
performance measures and associated annual Planning Assumptions have been agreed by 
the Operational Executive Team for the 2012/13 financial year, which provide the overarching 
framework for performance management across DWP Operations, and are in-keeping with the 
key principles of the PMF. That is, the inclusion of both the MVFE and off-flow rate measures, 
continued alignment of performance and financial processes, and emphasis on providing 
value for money, good customer service, as well as building necessary business capability and 
delivering the right policy outcomes in the right way.
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• There is a need to continue to champion cultural change and for managers at all levels of 
the organisation to promote this through their practice. There would appear to be a need to 
ensure that appropriate representatives are engaged to oversee and champion the continued 
development of the PMF in each Directorate.
• There is a need to continue to support the sharing of good practice between sites, Districts, Groups 
and Directorates. The role of Continuous Improvement will be central to this. 
• Renewed communications should support manager and staff awareness of the availability of 
timely off-flow performance information, especially in Jobcentre Directorate.
• The ‘into employment’ aspect of the ‘off-flow’ measure should be introduced as soon as possible. 
• Line manager capability (down to team leader level) is central to the successful implementation 
of the changes envisaged by the PMF. There is some evidence to suggest that enhanced training 
of this group in relation to awareness, understanding of the PMF and in supporting/challenging 
performance may be beneficial in supporting cultural change.
• Expectations around Adviser practice in the context of increased flexibility and autonomy may 
need to be clarified, in particular in relation to customer/caseload prioritisation.
• There is scope for further development of the PMF in several respects:
 – further development/streamlining of the scorecards; 
 – integration of the PDCS and Work Programme; and
 – the streamlining and alignment of accountability arrangements between the DWP and its 
delivery structures, through the Business Planning Process.
• There is also scope for increasing external transparency through publication of performance data 
in the PMF, especially where this is produced as a single set of DWP-wide performance information 
and linked to the publication of the Business Plan and associated datasets.
8.3 Implications for future research
Findings from this evaluation suggest that there are a number of themes that might be explored in 
any future research on performance management in Jobcentre Plus:10
• The governance of the PMF, especially in relation to processes for managing performance variation 
and relationships with key external stakeholders with an interest in Jobcentre Plus performance.
• The evolution of trust in performance data and how this influences management practice, 
especially in Jobcentre Directorate. In particular, whether managers are able to use and interpret 
both the off-flow and into employment data.
• The way in which performance management influences the changing role of Advisers in relation 
to their outcome versus activity orientation (see Figure 4.1) and the customer priotisation in 
Adviser caseloads.
• The evolution of practice in relation to the possibility of perverse incentives in relation to activities 
undertaken with customers, related specifically to job submissions, referrals to provision and 
conditionality testing.
10 As highlighted throughout this chapter, some of these issues will be picked up by the ongoing 
evaluation of the Jobcentre Plus Offer.
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• The evolution of practice in relation to scorecards and the scope for further review and refinement 
of these.
• The extent to which Continuous Improvement arrangements provide a mechanism for sharing of 
good practice and identifying solutions to performance variation.
• The way in which the organisation – from top to bottom – deals with short-term variations in 
performance and the extent to which consistency of management and cultural emphasis is 
retained.
• The way in which staff respond to the MVFE measure.
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Appendix A 
Full list of research questions
Design criteria Research questions
1. Focus on fewer, well-defined outcomes 
that provide Jobcentre Plus with a 
clarity of purpose;
A. Is the performance of Jobcentre Plus being measured 
in the right ways?
B. Are the outcome and supporting measures well 
defined and are there fewer of them in practice?
C. Do the outcome measures provide Jobcentre Plus 
with clarity of purpose?
D. Are the supporting measures being used effectively to 
help judge performance in the round?
2. Allow the use of flexibility and 
prioritisation by managers in managing 
delivery, with the expectation that 
this will deliver strong outcome 
performance;
A. In what ways do different performance measures 
influence staff to make decisions about targeting 
resources?
B. Does the new PMF help provide a more flexible 
delivery environment and encourage local managers 
to make decisions on focus and prioritisation to 
improve performance?
3. Be responsive enough to allow 
flexibility that enables the organisation 
to manage business performance at 
strategic and operational levels and 
quickly adjust for changes arising from 
Spending Review settlements and the 
future business architecture;
A. Does the PMF provide adequate support within the 
increasingly flexible environment?
B. Is the new performance framework helping Jobcentre 
Plus fulfil its remit in relation to the successful 
implementation of the Work Programme?
C. How well does the PMF fit with the financial 
management of Jobcentre Plus?
D. How well does the PMF fit with the division of labour 
between the delivery arms of Jobcentre Plus?
E. Does the PMF promote a greater emphasis upon 
productivity and value for money?
4. Provide clarity and transparency to 
internal and external stakeholders 
about how we deliver what’s most 
important to our customers and staff;
A. How are the governance routes working under the 
new PMF?
B. Do internal and external stakeholders have a clear(er) 
view of performance?
C. Do internal and external stakeholders have a clear(er) 
view of how services are being delivered?
5. Demonstrate integrity in the use of 
resources and recording and reporting 
of relevant quality inputs, impacts and 
outcomes; 
A. Is there a clear line of sight between activities, 
productivity and outcomes?
B. Does the PMF have an influence upon referral rates to 
the Work Programme, i.e. does this lead to creaming 
and parking practices in Jobcentre Plus?
C. Is there any evidence of perverse behaviours/gaming 
following the introduction of the PMF? How has this 
changed compared to the previous regime?
D. Does the new PMF encourage more focus on the 
quality of service delivery and value for money?
Continued
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Design criteria Research questions
6. Are co-designed to ensure a clear line 
of sight and integration into business 
processes at every level – i.e. it needs to 
‘speak’ to all staff from the operational 
frontline up to the Ministerial team
A. What do staff understand about the PMF?
B. Do staff understand the key elements and underlying 
principles of the PMF?
C. How effective have Jobcentre Plus communications 
about the PMF been?
D. Is there a consistent interpretation of the PMF at 
different levels in the organisation?
E. Has there been a change in emphasis and priority 
since the new PMF was introduced and, if so, what 
are now the most important priorities under the new 
framework?
7. Help to drive up the quality of customer 
service, including greater flexibility, 
personalisation and localism whilst at 
the same time supporting diversity and 
addressing equality issues;
A. Are staff and managers more focused and 
accountable for the right outcomes for customers?
B. Is there enough incentive to work with harder-to-
help groups? How has this changed compared to the 
previous regime?
C. Do staff feel that the PMF facilitates improvements in 
service delivery?
D. How do staff prioritise their work with different 
customer groups?
E. How does the new PMF influence staff relationships 
with and services delivered to customers?
F. Is the quality of customer service being measured 
and understood adequately?
G. Are Equality Act requirements being fulfilled with 
respect to performance monitoring?
8. Create a culture of exemplary 
behaviour, whereby staff feel 
motivated and empowered to 
enhance the customer experience, and 
individuals and groups feel that they 
can take responsibility for continuous 
improvement; and
A. Do staff feel more motivated by the new PMF?
B. How does the new PMF influence staff behaviour? 
How large a role does the PMF play in driving adviser 
behaviour, in comparison with, for example, the need 
to follow guidance and to get the job done?
C. Do staff have faith in the measures? Do considerations 
of the reliability of the performance information affect 
the way staff view the PMF?
D. Has the increased emphasis on off-flows into 
employment led to creaming and parking practices?
E. Are there specific examples of continuous 
improvement which have been fostered by the PMF?
Continued
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Design criteria Research questions
9. Enable the management and 
recognition of performance variation 
at all levels, allowing the celebration of 
success and identification of areas for 
improvement.
A. Are we able to act quickly enough if performance 
deteriorates?
B. What are the arrangements for performance 
management and monitoring under the PMF and 
have staff noticed any changes in this?
C. Is there sufficient management information to 
support the measurement of the key outcomes and 
supporting measures of the PMF?
D. Is success, defined in terms of outcomes, being 
celebrated?
E. Is performance improvement activity focused on 
outcomes?
F. Is the PMF driving continuous improvement and 
reducing performance variation across all priorities 
(including cross-cutting priorities)?
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Appendix B 
Interview Topic Guides  
Topic Guide A: For senior leadership and management respondents
This topic guide is to be used for interviews and group discussions with leaders and managers at 
national, Directorate and Group Delivery level.
Please ensure that you have done the following before commencing the questions:
• Distributed the information sheet about the project to all respondents.
• All respondents have completed the authorisation sheet.
• You have briefly explained the purpose of the project and the arrangements for anonymity and 
confidentiality.
The questions are intended as a guide rather than a questionnaire. Where respondents open up 
new or unexpected lines of enquiry which are relevant, these should be pursued. Fieldwork in each 
district should cover the full range of question areas.
The questions in the boxes are provided to show the questions that we will be trying to answer in 
the relevant section of the research outputs.
1 Understanding and clarity of purpose
Headline question: What affect has the new way of measuring performance had on streamlining 
Performance Management and strengthening clarity of purpose?
1.1 Why was a new way of measuring performance necessary?
In particular:
• What do you think are the main features of the new way of measuring performance? (Check PMF, 
OPPC scorecards and the Performance Agreement).
1.2 What was the main objective of changing the system of performance measurement?
1.3 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance is an appropriate way of measuring 
Jobcentre Plus performance? (use pp.9/10 slide from Operational Workshop PPt as interview aid)
In particular:
• Do you think the removal of targets is appropriate? Why/Why not?
• Do you think the focus on two outcome measures is appropriate? Why/Why not?
• Are the supporting data appropriate/Comprehensive? What’s missing?
• Are the Scorecards appropriate and/or comprehensive?
• What other methods or products are used to measure and monitor performance?
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2 Communication and implementation
Understanding, awareness and communications: How was the implementation of the new way of 
measuring performance communicated and how do different groups of staff understand it and its 
purpose?
2.1 What role did you have in the communication and implementation process?
In particular:
• Do you think you were effectively engaged/involved/consulted on in the process?
2.2 To what extent do you think staff are now aware of the change?
In particular:
• Which staff groups are more and less aware?
• To what extent are the full details of the change understood? – give examples.
2.3 What worked well in the implementation?
In particular:
• Which channels of communication were effective? Why?
2.4 What didn’t work well in the implementation?
In particular:
• Which channels of communication didn’t work well? Why?
2.5 How could the implementation of the new way of measuring performance have been 
improved?
3 Flexibility, resources and value for money
Flexibility and allocation of resources: How does the new way of measuring performance support 
the flexible allocation of resources at the local level? 
Flexibility and Value for Money: How does the new way of measuring performance assist in 
enabling Jobcentre Plus to respond to changing requirements, achieve efficient integration of its 
delivery and deliver value for money?
3.1 How is the new way of measuring performance influencing the allocation of resources at 
National/Group Delivery Network level?
3.2 For Jobcentre Directorate – How does the new PMF work together with the new flexible regime 
to deliver a good service for customers?
3.3 Does the new way of measuring performance encourage local managers to make decisions in 
order to improve performance?
3.4 How does the new way of measuring performance help to promote productivity?
Appendices – Interview Topic Guides 
54
3.5 How does the new way of measuring performance influence the relationship between 
Jobcentres, Contact Centres and Benefit Centres?
3.6 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance ensures that Jobcentre Plus is 
efficient with its resources?
In particular:
• Are there any ways in which the new way of measuring performance encourages good or bad use 
of resources (e.g. Flexible Support Fund dispersal etc)? Please give examples.
4 Motivation, behaviour and integrity
Staff behaviour and motivation: How does the new way of measuring performance affect staff 
motivation?
Responsiveness to and appropriateness of performance signals: To what extent does the new way 
of measuring performance provide appropriate operational performance signals?
Integrity and management incentives: How does the new way of measuring performance affect 
the operation of desirable and undesirable incentives within the organisation?
4.1 What impact do you think the new way of measuring performance has had on staff 
motivation?
4.2 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance appropriately incentivises 
performance?
4.3 To what extent do managers/staff do anything differently as a result of the new way of 
measuring performance?
4.4 How do you use the new way of measuring performance to manage the performance of 
different districts/Jobcentres/BCs/CCs/Delivery arms? 
In particular:
• How do you use the Outcome measures?
 – How do you use the supporting data?
 – How do you use the scorecards?
 – Are you making/arriving at any assumptions about the relationship between supporting data 
and outcome measures? 
 – To what level of aggregation do you use the data (e.g. down to individuals)?
 – Do you use the data to establish baseline levels of performance for staff/teams/offices?
4.5 How has the introduction of the new way of measuring performance influenced/changed your 
ability to manage/monitor/understand performance?
4.6 What impact do you think the reorganisation of and staffing changes in performance 
monitoring and performance improvement with the introduction of OPPC has had?
• What impact do you think the further reorganisation of PR and PI in DWP has had?
4.7 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance is based on robust data?
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4.8 Would you change managerial messages or reallocate resources as a result of the information 
in the outcome measure or supporting data? Examples?
4.9 How has the new way of measuring performance impacted on perverse incentives?
In particular
• Creaming/Parking?
• Impact on referrals to Work Programme? (Only relevant for Jobcentre Directorate)
• Impact on referrals to decision makers? (for sanction). (Only relevant for Jobcentre Directorate)
4.10 To what extent and how does the new way of measuring performance help to improve the 
performance of Jobcentre Plus?
5 Governance and transparency
Governance transparency and clarity: How effective is the governance of the PMF under the new 
way of measuring performance?
5.1 How has the new way of measuring performance affected the way in which you hold staff/
organisational units accountable for their performance?
5.2 How has the new way of measuring performance affected the way in which you are held 
accountable for performance?
5.3 How has the new way of measuring performance affected your relationship with external 
stakeholders?
In particular:
• Employers?
• Service providers?
5.4 Do you think that the publication of Jobcentre Plus performance data provides an accurate 
and transparent perspective on Jobcentre Plus performance?
6 Customer service and value for money
Quality of customer service and prioritisation of customer needs: How does the new way of 
measuring performance affect the quality and nature of service delivered to different customer 
groups.
6.1 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance incorporates the right balance 
between varying/competing objectives such as outcomes/customer experience and Value for 
money? 
6.2 Does the new way of measuring performance lead to better value for money? How?
6.3 Relative to other changes, in your view how has the new way of measuring performance 
affected the level of customer service? Examples?
6.4 Has the new way of measuring performance affected the way staff work with harder to help 
customer groups (e.g. drugs/alcohol, homeless, offenders)? If so in what way (for each group)? 
How has this come about? Examples?
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6.5 How has the new way of measuring performance affected the way in which staff work with 
other customer groups? How has this come about? Examples?
6.6 Has the new way of measuring performance had any particular negative effects on customers 
because of their gender, sexuality, age, religion or belief, marital status? In what way? How has 
this come about? Examples?
7 Other issues
7.1 How does the new PMF contribute to moving forward/delivering the Social Justice Agenda? 
• Fairness?
• Poverty?
7.2 Is there anything else you would like to say about the new way of measuring performance?
Jobcentre Plus PMF evaluation  
Topic Guide B: For operational manager respondents
This topic guide is to be used for interviews and group discussions with Operational managers in 
Jobcentre Plus Districts including BDCs and CCs.
Please ensure that you have done the following before commencing the questions:
• Distributed the information sheet about the project to all respondents.
• All respondents have completed the authorisation sheet.
• You have briefly explained the purpose of the project and the arrangements for anonymity and 
confidentiality.
The questions are intended as a guide rather than a questionnaire. Where respondents open up 
new or unexpected lines of enquiry which are relevant, these should be pursued. Fieldwork in each 
district should cover the full range of question areas.
The questions in the boxes are provided to show the questions that we will be trying to answer in 
the relevant section of the research outputs
1 Understanding and clarity of purpose
Headline question: What affect has the new way of measuring performance had on streamlining 
Performance Management and strengthening clarity of purpose?
1.1 Can you describe the new way of measuring performance since April? (Use pp.9/10 slide from 
Operational Workshop PPt as interview aid)
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In particular:
• What do you think are the main features of the new way of measuring performance?
1.2 What do you think the main objective of changing the system of performance measurement 
was?
1.3 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance is an appropriate way of measuring 
performance for your team/office/district?
In particular:
• Do you think the removal of targets is appropriate? Why/Why not?
• Do you think the focus on two outcome measures is appropriate? Why/Why not?
• Are the supporting data appropriate/comprehensive? What’s missing?
• Are the Scorecards appropriate and/or comprehensive?
• What other methods or products do you use to measure and monitor performance at a local 
level?
1.4 What do you understand the purpose of Jobcentre Plus to be, and does the new way of 
measuring performance support this? Why/why not?
2 Communication and implementation
Understanding, awareness and communications: How was the implementation of the new way of 
measuring performance communicated and how do different groups of staff understand it and its 
purpose?
2.1 How were you informed about the implementation of the new way of measuring 
performance?
In particular:
• Did you get the right information at the right time?
2.2 How did you inform your staff about the change?
2.3 To what extent do you think your staff are now aware of the change?
In particular:
• Which staff groups are more and less aware?
• To what extent are the full details of the change understood? – give examples.
2.4 What worked well in the implementation?
In particular:
• Which channels of communication were effective? Why?
2.5 What didn’t work well in the implementation?
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In particular:
• Which channels of communication didn’t work well? Why?
2.6 How could the implementation of the new way of measuring performance have been 
improved?
3 Flexibility, resources and value for money
Flexibility and allocation of resources: How does the new way of measuring performance support 
the flexible allocation of resources at the local level? 
Flexibility and Value for Money: How does the new way of measuring performance assist in 
enabling Jobcentre Plus to respond to changing requirements, achieve efficient integration of its 
delivery and deliver value for money?
3.1 How is the new way of measuring performance influencing the allocation of resources at 
district or site level?
3.2 Does the new way of measuring performance encourage you/local managers to make 
decisions to improve performance?
3.3 How does the new way of measuring performance help to promote productivity?
3.4 How does the new way of measuring performance influence the relationship between 
Jobcentres, Contact Centres and Benefit Centres?
3.5 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance ensures that Jobcentre Plus is 
efficient with its resources?
In particular:
• Are there any ways in which the new way of measuring performance encourages good or bad use 
of resources (e.g. Flexible Support Fund dispersal etc)? Please give examples.
3.6 For Jobcentre Directorate – How does the new PMF work together with the new flexible regime 
to deliver a good service for customers? 
4 Motivation, behaviour and integrity
Staff behaviour and motivation: How does the new way of measuring performance affect staff 
motivation?
Responsiveness to and appropriateness of performance signals: To what extent does the new way 
of measuring performance provide appropriate operational performance signals?
Integrity and management incentives: How does the new way of measuring performance affect 
the operation of desirable and undesirable incentives within the organisation?
4.1 What impact do you think the new way of measuring performance has had on staff 
motivation?
4.2 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance appropriately incentivises 
performance?
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4.3 Do managers/staff do anything differently as a result of the new way of measuring 
performance?
4.4 How do you use the new way of measuring performance to manage the performance of 
different individuals/teams/offices? 
In particular:
• How do you use the Outcome measures?
• How do you use the supporting data?
• How do you use the scorecards?
• Are you making/arriving at any assumptions about the relationship between supporting data and 
outcome measures? 
• To what level of aggregation do you use the data (e.g. down to individuals)?
• Do you use the measures to establish baseline levels of performance for staff/teams/offices?
4.5 How has the introduction of the new way of measuring performance affected your ability to 
manage/monitor/understand performance?
4.6 What impact do you think the reorganisation of and staffing changes in performance 
monitoring and performance improvement with the introduction of OPPC have had? (Prompt 
which recognises the further reorganisation of Performance Reporting and Performance 
Improvement in DWP) 
4.7 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance is based on robust data?
4.8 To what extent do you use the outcome measure to monitor your performance?
4.9 To what extent do you use the supporting data to monitor your performance?
In particular:
• Which supporting data do you use to understand and analyse your performance?
• Which supporting data does your manager use to monitor your performance? 
4.10 Would you change managerial messages or reallocate resources as a result of the information 
in the outcome measure or supporting data? Examples?
4.11 How has the new way of measuring performance impacted on perverse incentives?
In particular
• Creaming/Parking?
• Impact on referrals to Work Programme? (Only relevant for Jobcentre Directorate)
• Impact on referrals to decision makers? (for sanction) (Only relevant for Jobcentre Directorate)
4.12 To what extent and how does the new way of measuring performance help to improve the 
performance of Jobcentre Plus?
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5 Governance and transparency
Governance transparency and clarity: How effective is the governance of the PMF under the new 
way of measuring performance?
5.1 How has the new way of measuring performance affected the way in which you hold your 
staff accountable for their performance?
5.2 How has the new way of measuring performance affected the way in which you are held 
accountable for the performance of your team/office/district?
5.3 How has the new way of measuring performance affected your relationship with external 
stakeholders?
In particular:
• Employers?
• Service providers?
5.4 Do you think that the publication of Jobcentre Plus performance data provides an accurate 
and transparent perspective on Jobcentre Plus performance?
6 Customer service and value for money
Quality of customer service and prioritisation of customer needs: How does the new way of 
measuring performance affect the quality and nature of service delivered to different customer 
groups
6.1 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance incorporates the right balance 
between varying/competing objectives such as outcomes/customer experience and Value for 
money? 
6.2 Does the new way of measuring performance lead to better value for money? How?
6.3 Relative to other changes, in your view how has the new way of measuring performance 
affected the level of customer service?
Please give examples.
6.4 Has the new way of measuring performance affected the way your staff work with harder to 
help customer groups (e.g. drugs/alcohol, homeless, offenders)? If so in what way? How has 
this come about? Examples?
6.5 How has the new way of measuring performance affected the way in which your staff work 
with different customer groups? If so in what way? How has this come about? Examples?
6.6 Has the new way of measuring performance had any particular negative effects on customers 
because of their gender, sexuality, age, religion or belief, marital status? In what way? How has 
this come about? Examples?
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7 Other issues
7.1 Is there anything else you would like to say about the new way of measuring performance?
Jobcentre Plus PMF evaluation  
Topic Guide C: For operational staff respondents in Jobcentre Plus 
Districts
This topic guide is to be used for interviews and group discussions with operational staff in Jobcentre 
Plus Districts.
Please ensure that you have done the following before commencing the questions:
• Distributed the information sheet about the project to all respondents.
• All respondents have completed the authorisation sheet.
• You have briefly explained the purpose of the project and the arrangements for anonymity and 
confidentiality.
The questions are intended as a guide rather than a questionnaire. Where respondents open up new 
or unexpected lines of enquiry which are relevant, these should be pursued. Fieldwork in each district 
should cover the full range of question areas.
The questions in the boxes are provided to show the questions that we will be trying to answer in the 
relevant section of the research outputs.
1 Understanding and clarity of purpose
Headline question: What affect has the new way of measuring performance had on streamlining 
Performance Management and strengthening clarity of purpose?
1.1 Have you noticed any change to the way that performance is measured since April? (Prompt 
personal/team/division)
1.2 Can you describe the new system of measuring performance?
In particular:
• What data do you use to understand your performance?
• What data does your manager use to manage your performance?
• To what extent do you or your manager use ‘supporting data’ (you may need to describe these…)?
• Is the new way of measuring performance reflected in your Key Work Objectives for this year?
1.3 What do you think the main objective of changing the system of performance measurement 
was? (Use pp.9/10 slides from Operational Workshop PPt as an interview guide)
1.4 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance is an appropriate way of measuring 
your performance, that of your team, site (etc) and that of the organisation?
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In particular:
• Do you think the removal of targets is appropriate? Why/Why not?
• Do you think the focus on two outcome measures is appropriate? Why/Why not?
1.5 What do you understand the purpose of Jobcentre Plus to be, and does the new way of 
measuring performance support this?
2 Communication and implementation
Understanding, awareness and communications: How was the implementation of the new way of 
measuring performance communicated and how do different groups of staff understand it and its 
purpose?
2.1 How were you informed about the new way of measuring performance?
In particular:
• Did you get the right information at the right time?
2.2 What worked well in the implementation?
In particular:
• Which channels of communication were effective? Why?
2.3 What didn’t work well in the implementation?
In particular:
• Which channels of communication didn’t work well? Why?
2.4 How could the implementation of the new way of measuring performance have been 
improved?
3 Flexibility, resources and value for money
Flexibility and allocation of resources: How does the new way of measuring performance support 
the flexible allocation of resources at the local level? 
Flexibility and Value for Money: How does the new way of measuring performance assist in 
enabling Jobcentre Plus to respond to changing requirements, achieve efficient integration of its 
delivery and deliver value for money?
3.1 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance helps you to have more flexibility to 
meet customer needs?
3.2 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance ensures that Jobcentre Plus is 
efficient with its resources?
In particular:
• Are there any ways in which the new way of measuring performance encourages good or bad use 
of resources (e.g. Flexible Support Fund, etc)? Please give examples.
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3.3 Does the new way of measuring performance have an impact on your relationship with 
colleagues in Jobcentres, Contact Centres and Benefit Centres? If so, how?
3.4 For Jobcentre Directorate – How does the new PMF work together with the new flexible regime 
to deliver a good service for customers? 
4 Motivation, behaviour and integrity
Staff behaviour and motivation: How does the new way of measuring performance affect staff 
motivation?
Responsiveness to and appropriateness of performance signals: To what extent does the new way 
of measuring performance provide appropriate operational performance signals?
Integrity and management incentives: How does the new way of measuring performance affect 
the operation of desirable and undesirable incentives within the organisation?
4.1 How are the data on your performance communicated to you and discussed? 
4.2 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance has helped you and your colleagues 
to be more focused on the outcome of helping people move quickly from benefits to 
employment?
4.3 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance will help to improve efficiency and 
value for money?
4.4 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance will help to improve on Fraud and 
Error (MVFE)?
4.5 What impact has the new way of measuring performance had on your motivation?
In particular:
• Are you less or more motivated?
• Does the new way of measuring performance change the things that you are motivated to do?
4.6 Do you do anything differently as a result of the new way of measuring performance?
4.7 Do you and other colleagues try to use the new way of measuring performance (outcome and 
supporting data) to compare the performance of individuals and groups? If so how?
4.8 Does your manager use the new way of measuring performance (outcome and supporting 
data) to manage your performance and that of your colleagues? If so, how? Examples?
4.9 How does the new way of measuring performance compare with other motivations (need to 
process customers, customer satisfaction, guidance and operating procedures)?
4.10 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance is based on robust data?
4.11 To what extent do you use the outcome measures to monitor your performance?
4.12 To what extent do you use the supporting data to monitor your performance?
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In particular:
• Which supporting data do you use to understand and analyse your performance?
• Which supporting data does your manager use to monitor your performance? 
4.13 Would you change your behaviour as a result of the information in the outcome measure or 
supporting data? Examples?
4.14 Does the new way of measuring performance present a (improved) logical link between your 
role and desired outcomes (e.g. the two outcome measures)?
4.15 How has the new way of measuring performance impacted on perverse incentives?
In particular
• Creaming/Parking?
• Impact on referrals to Work Programme? (Only relevant for Jobcentre Directorate)
• Impact on referrals to decision makers? (for sanction). (Only relevant for Jobcentre Directorate)
4.16 To what extent and how does the new way of measuring performance help to improve the 
performance of Jobcentre Plus?
5 Customer service and value for money
Quality of customer service and prioritisation of customer needs: How does the new way of 
measuring performance affect the quality and nature of service delivered to different customer 
groups?
5.1 Do you think that the new way of measuring performance incorporates the right balance 
between varying/competing objectives such as outcomes/customer experience and value for 
money? 
5.2 Does the new way of measuring performance lead to better value for money? How?
5.3 In your view how has the new way of measuring performance influenced the level of customer 
service? Examples?
5.4 Has the new way of measuring performance affected the way you work with harder to help 
customer groups (e.g. drugs/alcohol, homeless, offenders)? If so in what way (for each group)? 
How has this come about? Examples?
5.5 How has the new way of measuring performance affected the way in which you work with 
other customer groups? If so in what way (for each group)? How has this come about? 
Examples?
5.6 Has the new way of measuring performance had any particular negative effects on customers 
because of their gender, sexuality, age, religion or belief, marital status? If so in what way? 
How has this come about? Examples?
6 Other issues
6.1 Is there anything else you would like to say about the new way of measuring performance?
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Appendix C 
Summary of PMF objectives
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